Henry Jenkins Debunks Video Game Myths

As part of a companion site to a PBS series on videogames, MIT professor Henry Jenkins wrote an essay debunking eight common myths about videogames. He has an especially succinct debunking of the claim that videogames encourage real world aggression and violence,

Claims like this are based on the work of researchers who represent one relatively narrow school of research, “media effects.” This research includes some 300 studies of media violence. But most of those studies are inconclusive and many have been criticized on methodological grounds. In these studies, media images are removed from any narrative context. Subjects are asked to engage with content that they would not normally consume and may not understand. Finally, the laboratory context is radically different from the environments where games would normally be played. Most studies found a correlation, not a causal relationship, which means the research could simply show that aggressive people like aggressive entertainment. That’s why the vague term “links” is used here. If there is a consensus emerging around this research, it is that violent video games may be one risk factor – when coupled with other more immediate, real-world influences — which can contribute to anti-social behavior. But no research has found that video games are a primary factor or that violent video game play could turn an otherwise normal person into a killer.

Bruce Schneier on DRM

Bruce Schneier wrote an interesting essay for Wired highlighting the inherent problem of DRM which he likens to storing your valuables in a safe and then giving that safe to someone you don’t trust,

Think of a stored-value smart card: If the person owning the card can break the security, he can add money to the card. Think of a DRM system: Its security depends on the person owning the computer not being able to get at the insides of the DRM security. Think of the RFID chip on a passport. Or a postage meter. Or SSL traffic being sent over a public network.

These systems are difficult to secure, and not just because you give your attacker the device and let him utilize whatever time, equipment and expertise he needs to break it. It’s difficult to secure because breaks are generally “class breaks.” The expert who figures out how to do it can build hardware — or write software — to do it automatically. Only one person needs to break a given DRM system; the software can break every other device in the same class.

. . .

Separating data ownership and device ownership doesn’t mean that security is impossible, only much more difficult. You can buy a safe so strong that you can lock your valuables in it and give it to your attacker — with confidence. I’m not so sure you can design a smart card that keeps secrets from its owner, or a DRM system that works on a general-purpose computer — especially because of the problem of class breaks. But in all cases, the best way to solve the security problem is not to have it in the first place.

Godzilla vs. Cthulhu

Sometimes my wife sends me the strangest links, like this Godzilla vs. Cthulhu fanfic by C. L. Werner with flourishes like,

Suddenly our launch was swamped by a tremendous wave as a gargantuan form emerged from the deep waters off our starboard. Our cheers were drowned out by the monster’s mighty roar as the reptilian titan glared in disapproval at the shoggoth, even as the horror slithered across the waves. We cheered as Godzilla swam forwards to engage the formless abomination of prehistoric blasphemy. Before the alien horror of the shoggoth, Godzilla was the lesser of evils and we prayed for his victory.

Look for the sequel — Godzilla vs. Mecha-Cthulhu.