Day: October 19, 2006

Jeff Taylor takes a few swipes at John Ashcroft, but undermines his case by repeating a favorite staple of conspiracy nuts — that Ashcroft may have had prior warnings of the 9/11 attacks since he stopped flying commercial aircraft in the summer of 2001. The only problem is that isn’t true.

Taylor writes about Ashcroft’s new book, Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice, which attacks the 9/11 Commission as “obsessed with trying to lay the blame for the terrorist attacks at the feet of the Bush administration, while virtually absolving the previous administration of responsibility.”

Taylor argues that Ashcroft is at the “epicenter of the pre-9/11 ‘no warning’ cover story.” A key piece of evidence is an anonymous source who claims that Ashcroft was at a July 17, 2001 briefing at which the CIA said al-Qaida was poised to strike against U.S. interests. Ashcroft’s spokesman said the former Attorney General remembers a July 5 briefing about al-Qaida efforts to strike against U.S. interests overseas, but no briefing about any efforts to attack within the United States.

That sends Taylor over the edge, leading him to write,

There were, in fact, many pre-9/11 warnings. One involves the small matter of Ashcroft suddenly opting to ditch domestic commercial aircraft. As CBS News reported on July 26, 2001:

In response to inquiries from CBS News over why Ashcroft was traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines, the Justice Department cited what it called a “threat assessment” by the FBI, and said Ashcroft has been advised to travel only by private jet for the remainder of his term.

“There was a threat assessment and there are guidelines. He is acting under the guidelines,” an FBI spokesman said. Neither the FBI nor the Justice Department, however, would identify what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it.

Give the same set of circumstantial facts to any U.S. Attorney looking for fore-knowledge of corporate malfeasance and that lawyer would jump into an investigation to ferret out the truth.

And given the same set of facts, a journalist might actually want to find out if there was any subsequent reporting on this since July of 2001. In fact, Ashcroft was asked about this when he testified before the 9/11 Commission, and dispute that he had abandoned commercial air travel,

BEN-VENISTE: I agree with you, sir.

The problem was in the communication of information which did not reach those who might have made a difference.

Let me ask you, as my time is expiring, one question, which has been frequently put to members of this commission; probably all of us have heard this one way or another.

And we are mindful that part of the problem with the Warren commission’s work on the Kennedy assassination was the failure to address certain theories that were extant and questions and much of the work was done behind closed doors. So I would like to provide you with the opportunity to answer one question that has come up repeatedly.

At some point in the spring or summer of 2001, around the time of this heightened threat alert, you apparently began to use a private chartered jet plane, changing from your use of commercial aircraft on grounds, our staff is informed, of an FBI threat assessment. And, indeed, as you told us, on September 11th itself you were on a chartered jet at the time of the attack.

Can you supply the details, sir, regarding the threat which caused you to change from commercial to private leased jet?

ASHCROFT: I am very please pleased to address this issue.

BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.

ASHCROFT: Let me indicate to you that I never ceased to use commercial aircraft for my personal travel.

ASHCROFT: My wife traveled to Germany and back in August. My wife and I traveled to Washington, D.C., on the 3rd of September before the 17th — before the 11th attack on commercial aircraft.

I have exclusively traveled on commercial aircraft for my personal travel; continued through the year 2000, through the entirety of the threat period to the nation.

The assessment made by the security team and the Department of Justice was made early in the year. It was not related to a terrorism threat as a threat to the nation. It was related to an assessment of the security for the attorney general, given his responsibilities and the job that he undertakes. And it related to the maintenance of arms and other things by individuals who travel with the attorney general. And it was their assessment that we would be best served to use government aircraft.

These were not private chartered jet aircraft. These were aircraft of the United States government. And it was on such an aircraft that I was on my way to an event in Milwaukee on the morning of September the 11th.

So Ashcroft never did ditch commercial aircraft — he continued to fly throughout the summer — but used government aircraft for official business.

But fact-checking and reporting on Ashcroft’s denial doesn’t lend itself to the “Ashcroft knew” meme. Neither can Taylor be bothered to note that unlike in previous administrations, Ashcroft was never given access to copies of the President’s Daily Briefing, which would have included a lot more about potential terrorist threats. So, for example, although the President, Condoleeza Rice and others saw an August 6, 2001 PDB that mentioned the possibility of Al Qaeda seeking to strike within the United States, Aschroft testified to the 9/11 Commission that he never saw a copy of that PDB until early 2004.

I’m no fan of John Ashcroft, but Ashcroft also makes a point in his 9/11 Commission testimony that Taylor and others gloss over in their criticism of Ashcroft and the Bush administration pre-9/11.

One the one hand, Ashcroft et al are heavily criticized for not having done more to have prevented the attacks. There were numerous plans, memos, action alerts, etc. that outlined the danger posed by Al Qaeda and recommended strategies for disrupting the terrorist networks. On the other hand, what those pre-9/11 recommendations involved are exactly the sort of tactics that have drawn criticism as being too heavy handed and ignoring civil liberties,

Finally, the commission should study carefully the National Security Council plan to disrupt the al Qaeda network in the U.S. that our government failed to implement fully 17 months before September 11th.

ASHCROFT: This NSC millennium after action review declares that the United States barely missed major terrorist attacks in 1999 and cites luck as playing a major role.

Among the many vulnerabilities in homeland defenses identified, the Justice Department surveillance and FISA operations were specifically criticized in the after-action assessment of the millennium approach. They were criticized for what were identified as glaring weaknesses.

It is clear from the review that actions taken in the millennium period should not be the operating model for the U.S. government. In March of 2000, the review warns the prior administration of a substantial al Qaeda network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the U.S. capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here.

Furthermore, fully seventeen months before the September 11th attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here, using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, tougher visa and stronger border controls.

These are the same aggressive, often-criticized law enforcement tactics that we have unleashed for 31 months to stop another al Qaeda attack. These are the same tough tactics we deployed to catch al Mahri (ph), who was sent here by al Qaeda on September 10th, 2001, to facilitate a second wave of terrorist attacks on Americans.