SERIES: Security Now!
DATE: September 25, 2018
TITLE: SNI Encryption
HOSTS: Steve Gibson & Leo Laporte
DESCRIPTION: This week we look at additional changes coming from Google's Chromium team, another powerful instance of newer cross-platform malware, the publication of a zero-day exploit after Microsoft missed its deadline, the return of Sabri Haddouche with browser crash attacks, the reasoning behind Matthew Green's decision to abandon Chrome after a change in release 69 - and an “Ungoogled Chromium” alternative that Matthew might approve of - Western Digital's pathetic response to a very serious vulnerability, a cool device exploit collection website, a question about the future of the Internet, a sobering example of the aftermarket in unwiped hard drives, Mirai Botnet creators working with and helping the FBI, another fine levied against Equifax, and a look at Cloudflare's quick move to encrypt a remaining piece of web metadata.
SHOW TEASE: It's time for Security Now!. Steve Gibson is here. I'm back. And we're going to talk about a lot of things, including some things about the new Chrome that are making people upset, the bifurcation of the Internet, and a hack that takes advantage of a massive flaw in a NAS from Western Digital. It's all coming up next on Security Now!.
LEO LAPORTE: This is Security Now! with Steve Gibson, Episode 682, recorded Tuesday, September 25th, 2018: SNI Encryption.
It's time for Security Now!, the show where we cover your security and privacy online. I'm Leo Laporte. Yes, I'm back. He's never left, Steve Gibson. Do you ever go on a vacation ever? I don't remember you ever going on vacation.
STEVE GIBSON: I never have, no. There's nowhere I would rather be than right here, working on code and…
LEO: Oh, come on. Come on.
STEVE: No, it's true. It's sad. It's sad, but true.
LEO: Well, it's not sad. It's actually great. It's certainly more economical.
STEVE: Well, I'm just happy where I am. Lorrie's figured out…
LEO: But, yeah, doesn't your - yeah. Doesn't Lorrie want to go somewhere?
STEVE: She would love to, and she's figured out, well, okay, I'll just find some girlfriends and go with them.
LEO: Go by herself, yeah.
STEVE: I said, “Great, honey. We'll FaceTime.”
LEO: Where does Lorrie want to go?
STEVE: Everywhere. Anywhere.
LEO: See, I love to travel.
STEVE: She's normal. She's normal.
LEO: Where should we send Steve? You should go to Russia. You know where you should go is Estonia, the digital capital of Central Europe.
STEVE: They're really ahead of everybody else.
LEO: Yeah, yeah. You'd be welcome there. People would gather 'round. Hasn't anybody ever invited you to a conference or anything like that? Of course they have.
STEVE: No, I get that all the time, yeah.
LEO: And you just don't go.
STEVE: Yeah, it just doesn't make any sense. It's like, you know, I think the last thing I went to is RSA when I discovered Stina and Yubico. So that was good. But anyway…
LEO: This is the guy who's lived on ham sandwiches for 20 years.
STEVE: We're at Episode 682, the last episode of September. And Leo, you missed it last week because the Presidential Alert was originally scheduled for last week, but it's been postponed until next Wednesday.
LEO: But wait a minute. What do you mean? What Presidential Alert?
STEVE: We talked about this on the TWiT that I did with you two years ago.
LEO: Well, I know the capability exists.
STEVE: It's happening. Trump is going to tweet.
STEVE: It's actually, well…
LEO: Is it a test?
STEVE: Well, it's a FEMA test. And every cell phone which is turned on. And apparently the title is Presidential Alert. And it starts out…
LEO: It's the one alert you can't turn off on any phone.
STEVE: Correct, correct.
LEO: Supposedly only to be used in grave, dire national emergencies.
STEVE: Well, but of course you've got to push the test button every so often.
LEO: We've never - has it ever been tested? Never.
STEVE: Never been tested. It's the first time it's ever going to be done. And it was the weather back in the Southeast caused FEMA to say, you know, we don't want to confuse people with a test alert during a crisis. So they're bumping it to October 3rd, which is Wednesday, a week from tomorrow.
LEO: Is it during - what time is it?
STEVE: Oh, it will be. Yes, it'll be during your Wednesday podcast. I think it's some bizarre time like 2:18 p.m. Eastern.
LEO: Oh, great. It'll be right in the middle of Windows Weekly. Oh, boy. Well, that's good. Now, there's extreme, extreme penalties for rebroadcasting an EANS alert on the radio. And I know this because some DJ in New Orleans did it on - he worked for the company, the radio company I work for. And as a result, every three months I have to take a test, which mostly consists of “Is it ever okay to rebroadcast a sound that sounds like the EANS signal?” And the answer is no. “Thank you, you passed the test, and then we'll talk to you again in six months.” But this is going to be coming over the phone. I presume I could just hold it up to the microphone; right?
STEVE: I don't know if it makes any sound. It's a text message. So, you know, it's an SMS.
LEO: Oh, no, it makes a sound. Oh, you haven't - you must have turned off the Amber alerts.
STEVE: Oh, yeah.
LEO: It makes a loud, annoying sound, particularly if every cell phone in the room goes off at the same time. It's extremely loud.
STEVE: Either we don't get them, or everybody I know has turned them off because I've never had that…
LEO: Yeah, everybody's turned them off. But you can't turn this one off.
STEVE: Well, there's an effective alert system.
LEO: You will hear a loud noise. It will go [mimicking loud buzzer]. And then it doesn't say anything, it just pops up.
STEVE: It's like our cable TV provider. It's like they're saying it's a monthly test, but I swear it's like every other week.
LEO: Oh, that test I hate.
STEVE: It just shuts everything down and [mimicking loud buzzer]. It's, like, so annoying.
LEO: So just out of curiosity, does the President get to write the announcement? Or is FEMA going to do it?
STEVE: No, no. This one, this test, is prewritten. We know what it's going to say. I had it in our show notes because…
LEO: Because you know if President Trump was given the right to write that, he would do something wild.
STEVE: Yeah, he would have fun with it.
LEO: So to speak.
STEVE: Yeah. And it was almost three years ago that you and I and - who was our co-host? Because I came up for the holiday TWiT.
LEO: Yes, right.
STEVE: Or tweet or whatever. TWiT, yeah. And that was when we got the news that this was a new thing that was going to happen. And of course we'd had the election already, so we knew that it was going to be President Trump who would then have his finger on the button.
LEO: Yes, we talked about it, that's right. That's right.
STEVE: Yeah, exactly. So anyway, the first one happens a week from Wednesday.
LEO: Well, that'll be interesting.
STEVE: In the meantime - yes, it will. And I'll remind everybody next week, of course, too.
LEO: Yeah, please do because I have to be prepared for it on Wednesday.
STEVE: Yes, you do. So we've got - you missed a little bit of news. I realize you were sort of offline probably.
LEO: I did not follow what was going on at all.
STEVE: One of the things that Google did that was quite controversial…
LEO: Oh, yeah, I did follow this.
STEVE: …was they decided to stop displaying the www dot in front of domains that actually have that. And they also decided - they called them “trivial domains,” that one and “m dot.” Well, there was a huge outcry because they just sort of unilaterally surprised the world with Chrome 69 that sort of just stopped showing it.
LEO: Well, Safari's done that for a long time, but you can turn that feature off. Safari doesn't even show - they don't even show the domain name at all. And I remember I interviewed Tim Berners-Lee, who created this whole mess. And he said, “I never expected any of this stuff to be visible to the end user. This was for computers.”
STEVE: Yes. And we've often talked about how hostile https://www dot, it's just like, our moms should not have to be dealing with that. So we've got additional changes coming from Google's Chromium team that we're going to talk about. We have another powerful instance of newer cross-platform malware. Now it's all being written in Python so they can have multiplatform binaries in order to have a longer reach. We've got the publication of a zero-day exploit after Microsoft missed its deadline a couple weeks ago for September's Patch Tuesday. We're all expecting maybe they're going to make it for October. We've got the return of Sabri Haddouche, who you also wouldn't have heard about, probably, Leo, while you were on vacation.
STEVE: But he's the guy who was, while looking for DDoS attacks on web browsers, figured out how to crash iOS. And I tried it last week, both pre- and post- version 12. And sure enough, it crashed Safari and took iOS down with it. So he's back with some DDoS browser attacks, which is what our Picture of the Week refers to. Also, we have the reasoning behind Matthew Green's decision to abandon Chrome after a change that they also made in release 69 which has also let loose a firestorm on the 'Net.
LEO: Yeah. This is the one I thought you were talking about, yeah.
STEVE: Yeah. We've also got something called the “Ungoogled Chromium,” which is an alternative to Chrome that Matthew might approve of. We have Western Digital's pathetic response to a very serious vulnerability, a cool device exploit collection website that I just discovered when I was pursuing that previous story. A question about the possible fracturing of the Internet in the future that Eric Schmidt brought up at a conference last week. A sobering example of the aftermarket in unwiped hard drives. The Mirai botnet creators have been hired by the FBI. Another fine has been leveled at Equifax.
And believe it or not, if we have any time, we'll actually get around to the topic of this week, which is SNI Encryption. That's the Server Name Identification which is still being sent in the clear, even with the latest TLS v1.3 encryption, which is sort of metadata. You know, we've often talked about how, yeah, stuff is encrypted, but you can still see who you're sending it to. And so although you can't see into it, you can still see like the envelope. So Cloudflare has quickly moved to adopt an interesting addition to TLS v1.3. And Cloudflare just continues to do really neat stuff. So I think another jam-packed episode of Security Now!, with lots of interesting stuff for our listeners.
LEO: You've got us all champing at the bit. I can't wait to hear all of that stuff. Before we do, though, have you installed iOS 12? I guess you have, gather you have.
STEVE: Oh, yeah, yeah, everywhere, yup. And I agree with you…
LEO: And, now, I remember you hated 11.
STEVE: Well, what I hated was that 10, the last version of 10 where they crippled the performance, preemptively fearing that the battery wasn't strong enough.
STEVE: And on that 6S or that 6 Plus or whatever it is, the big boat that I have, even now, now we have that beta of the battery test, and it says 100%. Your battery's in perfect condition. Even so, they forced me to go to an iPhone 10. However, I'm quite happy where I am now. But yeah, so iOS 11 kind of began to get it better, and it runs just fine on 12. And I'm with you and Megan. I really like 12.
LEO: I do, too.
STEVE: I like the things that they've done.
LEO: I keep getting calls, Steve, from Apple. I don't know if you heard me mention this on Windows Weekly yesterday.
STEVE: I did, I did.
LEO: Got this this morning. I could play it back for you. It's the funniest thing. I just got another one while I was doing that ad. It basically says this is Olivia calling from Apple Support. Your iCloud's been breached. Don't, whatever you do, log into your iCloud. Don't use your Apple device. Call us at this toll-free number. Which keeps changing. So I just thought, well, I guess it could be true. So I logged into my - because I figured, well, if it is true, I'll certainly have, you know, I'm using two-factor. I doubt anybody's compromised my iCloud. But if it is true, I'll certainly have an email or something from Apple. So I log onto iCloud, and of course everything's fine. It's just a scam.
STEVE: Yeah. I wonder if they've, like, used up all the Microsoft support people.
LEO: I think that's probably it; right?
STEVE: Because they've switched over to Apple.
LEO: Unbelievable. Unbelievable. And they've called me now five times.
STEVE: And it is interesting that, I mean, it does plant that seed of doubt.
LEO: Yes. Yes.
STEVE: It's like, well, I don't think this is real, but, you know?
LEO: It's scary, yeah.
STEVE: And I get spoofy things sometimes, too. And you do just, like, your Google account has been compromised. And it drives a savvy person to go just make sure that isn't true. So at least we're not clicking on the link and just saying, oh, yeah. Give me a call.
LEO: And the reason I bring it up is I know anybody who listens to this show is going to go, yeah, right. But tell your friends and family they're doing it because Apple just announced new products. Everybody's getting new iPhones. And so there's some credibility to it. So tell your less savvy friends and family don't believe this thing. It's bogus. It's not real.
STEVE: Yeah. So our Picture of the Week relates to a story that we'll be getting to in a minute. When we talked about the iOS crash last week, Sabri had not put all of this together. Now there is a site where you, too, can go to crash your browser. It's ReaperBugs.com, R-E-A-P-E-R-B-U-G-S dotcom. And if you go to - it doesn't crash the moment you get there. You get to choose which browser you want it to stress. And so there's Reap Chrome, Reap Safari, and Reap Firefox.
LEO: I love it.
STEVE: And we will get to this in more detail later on. But it is just sort of a - it's sort of a kick that he created a website to host his various browser crashes. And it probably isn't such a big problem. I mean, again, we'll talk about that. But for the title on the picture I said, “First we crash; then we burrow inside.” And we do know that there are some classes of crashes which can be the beginnings of the development of an exploit. But in a world where our browsers are running code with ever-increasing performance, it's not necessarily the case that we're doing anything other than just abusing the power that code from some specific source, typically untrusted, is providing.
LEO: Is it safe to do this? Should I, I mean, this is a live picture from my Safari. Should I…
STEVE: Well, if you don't mind crashing it, it does crash it. I mean, it'll just - and we know why. It's a WebKit problem where one of the newer features of CSS allows the blending of the background. And the guy created some, I don't know how many hundreds of nested divs, each which invokes this blend operation and brings iOS, or brings Safari and in turn iOS to its knees.
LEO: Oh, I clicked the wrong button. I'm in Chrome.
LEO: That's why nothing happened. Let me refresh and do it in Chrome. There we go. Okay. Are you sure, he says. Yes, crash me. Now, I am on Mojave now. I don't know if that will protect me.
STEVE: Ah, that's interesting. And they just updated that. Because I did check it, and it crashed 11, whatever the last version of 11 was. And then also I updated to 12, and it crashed that, too.
LEO: Well, it looks like Google might have put in some protections because it doesn't seem to be crashing anything. So, huh.
STEVE: Okay. So speaking of Google, they're continuing to mess with Chrome's UI. So first they took away www and “m” as the prefixes. Then they came back. Then they announced that they were going to still take away www, but “m” is remaining. What they learned kind of the hard way, and this is why many people who were really upset with this a couple weeks ago argued that this should not just be something that Google can do unilaterally. You know, messing with the address is messing with Internet protocol. And, for example…
LEO: They're not messing with the address. They're just messing with what the Chrome displays; right? I mean, the…
STEVE: Well, except, for example, the “m” signifies you want the mobile version of a site. So the user has some control over whether they want “m dot” or not. So Google sort of missed this. They were just assuming that www was superfluous. And they learned that, whereas www may be, “m” can actually have some important meaning. And so, yeah, I mean, how many times have we talked about that this is not the way this should have all evolved, where we've got all this cruft on the beginning of our domain names. And I talked about how GRC used to accept either URL and always took you to the same place.
But then we ended up with Google search results being a mixture of www and non-www. And so, like, links were all diluted and confused. And so I began redirecting everyone to www. Now I'm sort of regretting that decision. It was maybe 15 years ago, and I maybe should have just said, okay, if you put in www I'm going to redirect you just to GRC.com. But anyway, Google has now decided that the file: is also - that doesn't make any sense to put in the URL. So with Chrome 70, the next release of Chrome, they're going to be adding what they call a “chip,” which is the visual flag to the left of the URL, which will just say “file.” And then they're going to reformat it so it just says, for example, c:\, you know, the normal path that you see in your OS. So that's another thing that they're going to be changing with Chrome 70. LEO: But to be clear, this is merely what is displayed to the end user; right? I mean, there's still internally file:. That's the protocol. And there's still internally “m dot” whatever, or www dot whatever; right? It's just what's showing up in that browser URL bar; right?
STEVE: Correct. But the idea was…
LEO: It's an indicator, I understand, to the end user that this is what you're getting.
STEVE: Right. Except if you do remove something like the “m dot,” which is semantically significant, that is, users may need to know are they at the mobile version of the site or not. So is it prefixed by “m dot”? And so in hiding this, Google was preventing users from seeing something relevant to where they were.
LEO: Yeah. You know why they don't, because it's not a standard. It's a practice.
LEO: And some people write “mobile.” Some people write “m.” There's no standard on what that prefix should be; right?
STEVE: Well, except that so the purists, you know, the Richard Stallmans and so forth of the Internet, I mean, really got upset with the idea that Google was deciding that www dot was so-called a “trivial subdomain” and could simply be removed from the URL. I mean, the rest is still being displayed, but they just decided, well, this is not - it's just superfluous. And so as a consequence of the outcry, it came back. And so but they're still saying that they're going to talk to standards bodies and see about coming up with some sort of uniform representation that everyone agrees upon. I mean…
LEO: Apple did this a long time ago. They stopped showing the fully qualified domain name in the browser bar. They just showed you, if you're at Yahoo, you're at Yahoo. It doesn't say Yahoo.com, even.
LEO: And then there's a setting. You can turn that off.
LEO: But I think Apple's attitude was, well, users don't need to see all that extra cruft. Especially since it's not a standard.
STEVE: Right. And I think where we are is just sort of, you know, in sort of this awkward place where we're moving into a different place where the standards that we've had that built the Internet are being, like, questioned, exactly like this. Is there a need for www on the front of the URL? And at this point we don't have a consensus. And so people got upset because Google just decided, well, we're going to change this. And they are the major browser on the Internet. They are the majority browser. And what was I going to say?
LEO: While you're thinking, let me just show you what Apple has decided in this regard. So I have it checked right now, “Show full website address.” But I can uncheck that. And then instead of seeing up here the fully qualified address, I'm just going to see Twitter.
LEO: Or Twitter.com. If I turn that on, I'll see this long URL. And you know what's missing is the actual URL for the site. It's just showing you're on Twitter. You can, if you copy it, you will get the fully qualified URL and everything after it.
STEVE: Yeah. Well, and you know, Leo, I think partly this is also a reaction to how incredibly ugly URLs have become.
LEO: Yeah, yeah. Look at the difference. Do you really want to see this? But you could make the argument, I could make the argument, well, yeah but I need to know this is the Verge's account, and this is a particular status from the Verge, instead of just, oh, generic, bland, I'm on Twitter.com. At least Apple gives you the choice here. But I don't think…
STEVE: And so giving the user choice, yes.
LEO: But the default is, by the way, the simplified version. And I bet you 99% of Mac users don't even know that. They don't. They're not aware of it.
STEVE: Right. So what's interesting is that apparently Lawrence Abrams of Bleeping Computer picked up on this. Apparently Google is experimenting with the same thing on their search results. In his posting, Lawrence wrote: “Google really wants to get rid of the www subdomain.” He says: “First we had Google removing www in Chrome 69 address bar, and now there is some test underway to remove it from search results, as well.” He wrote: “I was first alerted to this when one of BleepingComputer's reporters noticed that the BleepingComputer domain was showing up in Google search results as just https://bleepingcomputer.com,” although officially it is www.
He said: “When I checked from my end, though, it was showing it listed as normal with www.bleepingcomputer. While researching this behavior, I found many domains where Google was removing the www subdomain in the search results. Once I performed a refresh of the page” - meaning the search results page though - “the normal www subdomain would be listed again. In some cases, I could refresh over and over,” he wrote, “and the results would switch back and forth between www and non-www.
“Ultimately,” he says, “I could not get BleepingComputer.com to show the non-www version, so I found another site that was also performing this behavior. When I searched for Palo Alto Networks, it showed the domain listing without the www subdomain. If you clicked on the search result, the site would perform” - and this is interesting to me - “a 301 redirect to www,” which means they weren't just changing the visual, they were choosing not to - the URL itself did not have the www in it, so that Palo Alto Networks was doing a 301 redirect over to www. He says: ”…which is the site's desired behavior.“
He said: “On a refresh of the search result page, the normal www version of the URL appeared again in the search results. This time, though, the site links have been changed,” he said, “to a smaller display under the domain description.” And he goes on. But my guess is, as we know, Google has a massive server farm, and he was probably getting different servers picking up his query when he refreshed; and some of them for whatever reason were not showing www, and others were. And he did ask Google. He got no response from Google one way or the other to what they were doing and what was going on. But we do look like we're in some sort of flux here with whether or not or how Google is going to treat the www prefix on domain names.
LEO: It's an interesting question because - and I would hope, and this isn't the time to do it, but maybe at some point we could talk about how this all works. Because I don't need - www used to be the thing before the domain name.
LEO: Mail.www.whatever was the name of an actual machine; right? Is that…
STEVE: Correct. Yes.
LEO: I think for a long time that's not been the case. And in most cases a site doesn't need www dot anything.
STEVE: That is correct, yes.
LEO: That was to indicate that you're going to go to the machine that has the web server Apache's running on that machine. If you want to go to my email server, Postfix is running on mail dot.
LEO: But nowadays that's all handled with DNS in an invisible way; is it not?
STEVE: Well, actually it's more likely handled by port numbers because we have well-known ports. And so, for example, GRC's news server is at news.grc.com. It doesn't need to be because the news server uses port 119. And so it could just be GRC.com, and the news client knows to connect to port 119, in the same way that the web client knows to connect to 443 or 60. So you're right, Leo. It's sort of an old-school, you know, you have the domain name, and then you have the machines that are accessible on that domain name. And there are supposed to be prefixes of the domain name. But it's not necessary.
LEO: No. It's not handled that way anymore.
STEVE: And in fact I can't even think of, I mean, now, okay, the “m dot,” there's a place where, as you said, by convention rather than by standard, by convention the “m dot” has been a prefix which takes you to the mobile version of a website. But even there it could be the same IP.
STEVE: But when the URL comes up with an “m dot,” it gives you different content, which is optimized for mobile screen sizes.
LEO: Well, the perfect example is Twitter. If you go to m.twitter.com, you get a progressive web app for Twitter which is intended for mobile. But you know what, I just did it, and Twitter rewrites it as mobile.twitter.com. So it's not in fact the canonical name of that server.
LEO: And it's rewriting the name anyway. And there is no standard for what “m dot” means. So I think Google's attitude was, well, why should the end user be concerned about this? My only concern - I think it's probably yours, too - is from a security standpoint you kind of do want to know the fully qualified name that you're going to or that you're at or that that link points to. Right?
STEVE: Yeah. I would say you at least want to be able to get to it if you want it. When Google was doing this - and I did experience it briefly. It was funny, too, because, Leo, I put in www.GRC.com, and sure enough it showed me GRC.com. Then I put in blog.google.com, and it converted it to blog.google.
STEVE: And I thought, wait, what?
LEO: They own dot google.
But as you were just saying, Leo, we now have Ungoogled Chromium. And the tagline is “Bringing back the 'Don't' in 'Don't be evil.'” And this is on GitHub. There are binary builds for a bunch of different popular OSes I'll get to in a second. But Ungoogled Chromium describes itself as it's Google Chromium sans integration with Google. It also features some changes to enhanced privacy control and transparency.
For their motivation and description, they said: “A number of features or background services communicate with Google servers despite the absence of an associated Google account or compiled in Google API keys. Furthermore, the normal build process for Chromium involves running Google's own high-level commands that invoke many scripts and utilities, some of which download and use prebuilt binaries” - meaning that they're just saying there's some lack of full transparency there, you don't know really what they are - “provided by Google. Even the final build output includes some prebuilt binaries. Fortunately, the source code is available for everything.
“Ungoogled Chromium is a set of configuration flags, patches, and custom scripts. These components altogether strive to accomplish three things: Disable or weaken offending services and features that communicate with Google or weaken privacy; two, strip binaries from the source tree and use those provided by the system or build them from source; three, disable features that inhibit control and transparency, and add or modify features that promote them. These changes are minor and do not have significant impacts on the general user experience.”
And then they say that Ungoogled Chromium should not be considered a fork of Chromium. “The main reason for this is that a fork is associated with more significant deviations from the Chromium, such as branding, configuration formats, file locations, and other interface changes. Ungoogled Chromium will not modify the Chromium browser outside of the project's” - and they didn't say “limited,” but I'm adding “limited” - “goals. Since these goals and requirements are not precise, unclear situations are discussed and decided on a case-by-case basis.” And I've got a link to it, Ungoogled Chromium. I'm sure if you just Google it you'll find Ungoogled Chromium.
LEO: It's on GitHub.
STEVE: Yes, exactly. And I have a link to their prebuilt binaries. They are - most of them are very current. Debian 9.0 has a 69.0, so that's a current development binary, and 68 in release. Portable Linux has about the same thing. There's also one for, oh, Mac is at 68. Ubuntu is at also 67 for release or 69 for development. And Windows 64-bit has a binary at 67. So almost completely current. And again, they're not providing those. Other people have built those for those platforms. So caveat emptor. But still, it means you're not stuck having to build it yourself, and you can use a version of Chrome that has those things done to it. So as you said, Leo, it's a consequence of…
LEO: I think it is, yeah.
STEVE: Yes, of it being open source and Google saying, well, we're going to do this. If you don't like it, you can take what we've done and do something different.
LEO: I like that.
STEVE: Which I think is neat. Okay. So Western Digital. They have a very popular NAS known as My Cloud. That's one of the more popular Network Attached Storage devices because it is turnkey. It's more user-friendly than some of the more techie NASes. And it's able to offer a cloud-based access; right? So here's an example of something you attach to your network. It's able to poke a hole through your NAT router and make itself available globally so that you're able to access your NAS when you're out roaming around on the public Internet. For that, you want really good security, obviously. Otherwise, bad guys can get into your NAS, which nobody wants. That's why there is a username and password.
So security researchers at Securify discovered an authentication bypass vulnerability actually across the Western Digital My Cloud NAS boxes that could allow, actually very trivially, unauthenticated attackers with network access, meaning Internet access in the case of this thing being out on the cloud, to escalate their privileges to admin level without needing to provide a password. This allows attackers to run commands that would normally require admin-level privileges and gain complete control over the affected NAS device, giving them the ability to view, copy, delete, and overwrite any files on the device. So all that's horrible; right?
Okay. So what Securify wrote in their disclosure was: “Whenever an admin authenticates, a server-side session is created that is bound to the user's IP.” Okay. So you imagine somebody out on the Internet. They're logging into the NAS. And so this creates a session tied to their public IP. That's how sessions work. That's fine. They say: “After the session is created, it is possible to call authenticated CGI modules” - you know, executable modules - “by sending the cookie username=admin in the HTTP request.” Just a cookie. But that's after you've been authenticated. So, they say, “The invoked script, the CGI, will check if a valid session is present and bound to the user's IP address.” So that's fine.
However, what they discovered was it's possible for an unauthenticated or pre-authenticated attacker to create a valid session without being required to authenticate. Whoops. An authentication bypass. The network_mgr.cgi module contains a command called cgi_get_ipv6 that starts an admin session that is tied to the IP address of the user making the request when invoked with the parameter flag=1. Meaning that's all you have to give it. Subsequent invocation of commands that would normally then require admin privileges are now authorized if the attacker sets the username=admin cookie. And they show a proof of concept which is just, I mean, it's a standard post submission, an http post, to this manager, this network manager CGI, giving the cookie username=admin with a content length of 23 and just a single line, cmd=cgi_get and so forth, with a flag=1.
You send that to any Western Digital My Cloud NAS box, and you're authenticated as an administrator. And you can then do anything you want to from the Internet. And in their disclosure they say: “Next, call an endpoint” - meaning a command like cgi_get_ssh_pw - “that requires admin privileges and authenticate as admin by adding the cookie,” and it works.
Okay. So in Western Digital's blog just recently, I got a kick out of this, they said: “Recently, security researcher Securify published an authentication bypass vulnerability for our My Cloud products.” They said, “We are in the process of finalizing a scheduled firmware update that will resolve the reported issue. We expect to post the update on our technical support site at support.wdc.com within a few weeks.”
Okay. Now, but get this. What I didn't say is that on April 9th of 2017, okay, 2017, Securify discovered the vulnerability. And the next day, on April 10th of 2017, they notified and reported this to Western Digital customer support and were ignored. So they waited until September 17th of 2018, I mean, maybe they forgot. Like, what, 17 months? No, 19 months later? On September 17th of 2018, this month, they requested a CVE designation for this. They received it the next day, on the 18th, and later that day - on the 18th, so what's that, that's last Tuesday - published the details of this. Then they got, finally, Western Digital's attention.
After this vulnerability was known to Western Digital, these guys kept their mouth shut about it for 19 months. And within a few days, actually, three days it took Western Digital to update the firmware once this went public. So the firmware is now available. So the first takeaway is, because as we know there are bots, and there are bad guys out there scanning for this - so this became public knowledge a week ago, and there's no authentication on any of these Western Digital My Cloud products. So if you have one, and if it is publicly exposed, you absolutely definitely want to update the firmware on your device posthaste.
And I'm at a bit of a loss about what to do about, I mean, what they should have done. It's a vulnerability that they did not disclose, to their credit. But on the other hand it wasn't until they did disclose it that Western Digital then patched it in three days. So maybe they should have held Western Digital's feet to the fire, given them a 90-day deadline and said, look, as other companies do, as Google does with the things it finds, fix this in three months because we're going public with it whether you do or not. Then if Western Digital blew them off, well, once they went public, three days later this would have been fixed. To me, that would have been way better than leaving this unpatched for 19 months, during which time it could have certainly been possible that other people would have found this.
These guys found it by reverse-engineering the code in the My Cloud firmware, looking for vulnerabilities, and they found a big one, complete login authentication bypass, and told Western Digital, who then did nothing about it. So I'm unimpressed with Western Digital, except I'm kind of impressed with their response once they decided, ooh, we'd better fix this. They were certainly able to immediately. So I don't think they should have been given this much time to fix something that is this important. And anybody who does have a My Cloud system should absolutely get themselves updated immediately.
LEO: On we go, Steverino.
STEVE: So in researching the previous story about the NAS, there were some links that I was following. And I ran across a site I just wanted to put on our listeners' radar because I thought they would get a kick out of it. It's Exploiteers. So it's E-X-P-L-O-I-T-E-E dot R-S. So it's a clever use of the .rs TLD. And it's a site dedicated towards just sort of old-school hacking of all kinds of gadgets and IoT devices. For example, I just pulled one out because it was a Sony Blu-ray player, for example. They have there: “A bug exists in the MTK-supplied SDK which affects many Blu-ray players, including the BDP-S5100. The main binary, which controls all aspects of the player, has leftover debug instructions for the VUDU app. When the VUDU app is run, if a file exists named vudu.txt in a directory labeled vudu on a FAT-formatted flash…”
LEO: This is awesome.
STEVE: Isn't it? It's so cool. “It will attempt to execute vudu/vudu.sh and deletes vudu.txt. It runs this sh as root. Using the commands below, you can spawn a root telnet shell, allowing access into the device.” And then they just show you. It's a simple shell script, like five lines, that ends up running the telnet daemon. And so they explain: Put this on a file. Stick it on a FAT-formatted flash drive. Restart the device. Go to vudu on the Sony menu, and now this thing then runs a telnet server. So it's going to be listening on port 23. You then telnet to the Blu-ray, and you're in. But, I mean, the list is just like LG, Panasonic…
LEO: Well, it's a wiki, so people are adding to it; right?
STEVE: Yes, yes, yes, yes. And so, I mean, it's just like the Who's Who of - here they've got Google. There's a Belkin network [crosstalk]…
LEO: I have a lot of this old, obsolete hardware that's just sitting in a box. I can do something with it. That's nice.
STEVE: Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so they have pictures and videos. There's people hooking wires onto the motherboards of things and doing stuff. So just sort of fun hacking stuff.
LEO: You remember the Pogoplug? Got an old Pogoplug? Well, look at this. You can gain root, turn it into a little mini server. Wow, that's awesome. What a great site.
STEVE: Yeah, I just…
LEO: What is .rs? Is that Russia? Where is .rs?
STEVE: No, Russia's .ru, so I don't know what .rs is [Serbia].
LEO: I like it. Exploiteers. It's Exploitee.rs.
STEVE: Yeah, I just thought our listeners would get a kick out of playing with that. Okay. So this was weird. And I would argue against what Eric Schmidt believes. But last Wednesday, in San Francisco, at an event hosted by the venture capital firm Village Global, the economist Tyler Cowen asked about the possibility of the Internet fragmenting into different sub-Internets with different regulations and limited access between them in coming years. He said: “What's the chance, say, 10 to 15 years, we have just three to four separate Internets?” Eric Schmidt, who is of course the past CEO of Google and executive chairman of its parent company, Alphabet, predicted right there on the spot that within the next decade there will be two distinct Internets, one led by the U.S., and the other led by China.
STEVE: Yeah. Eric said, quote: “I think the most likely scenario now is not a splintering, but rather a bifurcation into a Chinese-led Internet and a non-Chinese Internet led by America. If you look at China,” he says, “and I was just there, the scale of the companies that are being built, the services being built, the wealth that is being created is phenomenal. Chinese Internet is a greater percentage of the GDP of China, which is a big number, than the same percentage of the U.S., which is also a big number.”
He says: “If you think of China as, like, 'Oh, yeah, they're good with the Internet,' you're missing the point. Globalization means that they get to play, too.” He says: “I think you're going to see fantastic leadership in products and services from China. There's a real danger that along with those products and services comes a different leadership regime from government, with censorship, controls, et cetera.” He says: “Look at the way BRI” - that's the Belt and Road Initiative. He said: ”…the way BRI works, which involves 60-some countries. It's perfectly possible those countries will begin to take on the infrastructure that China has with some loss of freedom.”
And I thought, okay, what? So I'm skeptical. I mean, first of all, we've talked a lot about the Great Wall, the firewall. We talked recently about the project that Google was outed as being working on in secret, which is to come back to China with a censored search in order to operate within the Chinese boundaries.
But, you know, in thinking about this, it occurred to me that we have an existing, much older, and very mature model in the global telephone system. And as far as I know, someone in China is able to phone someone in the U.S. and vice versa. I mean, it's not like there's a separate phone system, and they're not interconnected, and there's no way to talk across some artificial boundary. So I don't know, Leo. To me it's hard to imagine that economically you wouldn't lose so much by chopping the Internet into two pieces. It seems hard for me to imagine that that's realistic.
LEO: That's always been the argument against it, is you don't want to participate in the global economy? Okay, fine. But China's so big, in a way it is its own global economy. And remember that the phone system works that way because there are gateways. Similarly on the cell network there's a gateway between Verizon and T-Mobile.
STEVE: Yeah. Yeah.
LEO: So it's not inconceivable that there would be gateways. What China's interest is, of course, is in controlling the information flow from the West. And so I'm not sure that Eric is wrong. It's not the first time I've heard this idea. It's certainly what China would like to do. Whether China will succeed is another matter because, you're right, there's all this pressure to be global; right?
STEVE: Yeah. Yeah.
LEO: I don't know if it's a bad thing or not. We always had the Iron Curtain, remember? We're old enough to remember the Iron Curtain that separated the East from the West. That was, in effect, an economic block.
STEVE: Yeah. So something happened recently that caught a lot of attention. PC Mag had the headline: “Unwiped Servers With Data on Millions Sold on Craigslist.” Another headline: “Database servers sold at NCIX auction, allegedly without being wiped.” Bleeping Computer's headline: “Unwiped Drives and Servers from NCIX Retailer for Sale on Craigslist.” And so forth. Sophos, their Naked Security blog, had the story and, I thought, just very succinct coverage. They said: “Bankrupt NCIX customer data resold on Craigslist.” Sophos said: “For Canadian or U.S. customers of NCIX during the past 15 years, they should assume any personal data or credit card information logged with them is now potentially in the hands of cybercriminals and raise any suspicious transactions with their bank.”
Now, for those who are not aware, NCIX was a major Canadian online and brick-and-mortar retailer. Sophos said: “What happens to sensitive customer data when a large company that has collected it over many years suddenly goes bust?” And that's where we're going to get to here in a second. But they said: “It's easy to assume that databases are wiped by diligent IT staff just before they turn off the lights and close the door for the last time.”
LEO: Oh, sure they are.
LEO: Absolutely going to do that before they walk out. You bet.
STEVE: See ya. And they say: “At the very least that data should have been encrypted.” It wasn't. They say: “It has now emerged that something entirely different and more troubling took place when Canadian computer and electronics retailer” - and I sort of think of them as like the Fry's of Canada. They sort of had that profile. “Electronics retailer Netlink Computer Inc. declared bankruptcy in December of 2017.” So, okay, at the very end of last year.
“According to Privacy Fly researcher Travis Doering, the company simply abandoned” - not surprisingly - “much of its equipment in a hurry, which he discovered when it was offered for sale on Craigslist this August,” so month before last. “After arranging a meeting with the seller to examine the hardware, it turned out to comprise 20 Dell PowerEdge and Supermicro servers, 300 desktop PCs, 109 hard drives, and another 400-500 drives that had been inside those desktops or sent to it for repair.
“Now for the disturbing bit. It soon became clear that the valuable part of the data was not the drives themselves, but what was on them: 13TB of data all told, including 385,000 database records containing names, email addresses, phone numbers, and account passwords, 258,000 of which included full credit card payment details. A separate Canadian database contained 3.8 million customer records gathered by NCIX between January 2007 and July 2010. The seller had got hold of passwords to access the databases, while significant amounts of the data were not encrypted in the first place.” But get this. The seller understood the value of the data and was offering it, itself, for $15,000.
LEO: They knew.
LEO: There's good stuff on here, man.
STEVE: You can have all the data. Who could possibly take advantage of that?
STEVE: Anyway, so this was a bankruptcy. The landlord foreclosed, got the equipment, and so there we are. So of course this raises a good point. The Internet is driving a consolidation of retailers. And here's a big company that had a ton of data on its servers, and the question is whose responsibility is this when the company decides to walk away. It seems to me like it's the kind of thing that bankruptcy proceedings should evolve to consider is what about the data contained on your hardware? Because of course this stuff has to go through the courts in order to get liquidated. And apparently that's still something that just sort of is not being considered and is just slipping under the radar.
LEO: Do you remember - this was 2003. A guy named Simson Garfinkel and Abhi Shelat, they were graduate students at MIT. They bought on eBay 159 hard drives for $5 to $30. And this is 2003. So, you know, this is…
STEVE: Fifteen years ago.
LEO: Yeah. So of these drives - one of them came out of an ATM, by the way, completely unerased. It was a year's worth of transactions with account numbers. Another one had been formatted, but of course they used simple unerase utilities.
STEVE: Yeah, unformat.
LEO: Yeah, and they got 5,000 credit card numbers. Of the 150-some hard drives they bought, all but a few had - everything was still on it.
LEO: In many cases they just deleted what was in the My Documents folder. Isn't that funny? So this was 15 years ago. It still happens.
LEO: Nobody's learned.
STEVE: No change.
LEO: No change. We'll be telling this story in 15 years. Episode 999 we will have a similar story. The only thing that's changed is the hard drive capacity. I mean, these guys weren't that big.
STEVE: Yeah. So the U.K. regulator has fined Equifax 500,000 pounds, which is in U.S. dollars at the moment $658,419.
LEO: Holy cow.
LEO: Wow. Sharp slap on the wrist.
STEVE: Well, and it's reputation, it's like further reputation damage. As we all know, and as we have often talked about because Apache Struts stays in the news because it's continuing to have some problems, although less severe than the one that bit Equifax, they suffered a significant data breach in 2017 after leaving a widely known and long since patched flaw in Apache Struts present on their servers, which were facing the Internet, which allowed bad guys to get in and exfiltrate basically all of the Equifax sensitive data. And it's always easy to pick on someone after the fact. But a company such as Equifax, which is collecting and vacuuming up sensitive financial consumer information without our knowledge and permission, I mean, I never told Equifax I wanted them to do this. They're selling…
LEO: No, but it's a contingency on getting a loan or renting an apartment.
LEO: In the fine print down there it says we're going to provide this information to Equifax.
STEVE: Right. Oh, back to the credit reporting firm.
STEVE: Ah, okay.
LEO: Part of the deal.
STEVE: Anyway, so of course it's not unreasonable for us to expect them to be really, really careful with all this data that they have collected.
LEO: Oh, of course they are.
STEVE: And, I mean, this fine from the U.K. is like the least of their problems because of course they've been slapped with multiple class-action lawsuits. And, I mean, this is bad for them.
LEO: Yeah. But as of yet, I don't think Equifax has suffered any consequences. They've made more money than they've lost in this.
STEVE: Yes, well…
LEO: There is a story, though, that is very good news. Last Friday Congress passed a law saying that these companies - Equifax, TransUnion, what's the other one, Experian - couldn't charge for credit freezes anymore because they've been charging for those.
STEVE: Nice, yes.
LEO: So you can get one for free now in every state of the union. And they extended the length of fraud alerts from 90 days to a year. So, frankly, that's a punishment because that hits them at the bottom line; right? They can't make money off of you if you've got a credit freeze.
LEO: So I'm telling everybody I know, you can now, if you're worried about this, get a credit freeze or a fraud alert at no cost from all three.
STEVE: Yeah. So, okay, just to wrap up this story, almost 20,000 U.K. customers had their names, dates of birth, telephone numbers, and driving license numbers exposed; 637,000 customers had their names, dates of birth, and telephone numbers exposed; 50 million U.K. customers had names and dates of birth exposed; 27,000 people in the U.K. had their Equifax account email addresses swiped; and 15,000 U.K. customers had their names, dates of birth, addresses, account usernames, plaintext passwords, account recovery secret questions and answers, obscured credit card numbers, and spending amounts stolen.
STEVE: So that just pissed off the U.K. big-time.
STEVE: And they lowered the hammer. That 500,000 pounds is the largest fine that can be levied against a company. And, yes, it's a slap on the wrist to a $15 billion company like Equifax. But still, it keeps it in the news. And, boy, you do not want to be a CIO of some other company that does something like this. And I have to say, Leo, at this point, look at what we're covering every week. There ought to be a full-time job in every company of size that has something to protect, where that person's sole job is to scan the update notices of every piece of software that they're using, packages like Apache Struts, looking for important updates to it and then pushing the company to roll out fixes. I mean, they ought to just…
LEO: That's something GDPR mandates is a data protection officer.
STEVE: Yeah, yeah.
LEO: In fact, GDPR would have killed these guys if this had happened today; right?
STEVE: Oh, yes, yes. I found a nice note as I was going through my email bag from Louis Vincent in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. The subject caught me: “SpinRite fixes Task Manager.” And of course that's not actually what happened. But he said: “Hi, Steve. SpinRite owner since 2007. Security Now! listener yada yada. This past week my laptop started grinding to a halt. With no program running, Task Manager would show that the CPU was pinned at 100%.” He said: “Did I have a crypto miner on my device, I wondered? The weird thing was that Task Manager was showing that the process taskmgr.exe was itself taking 40-50% of the CPU, with McAfee taking most of the rest.” Actually, I have a theory I'll share in a second. “That was odd, at least for the taskmgr.exe.”
He says: “I did not find the issue while in Safe Mode. But every time I logged back in normally, taskmgr.exe was back hogging the CPU. I decided to SpinRite the 500MB hard drive. As you might imagine, a couple of hours later SpinRite reports nothing crucial found on the drive. But a reboot later, and everything is working as it was at the beginning of the week. Thanks for a great product.”
So this is another story, actually we covered one while you were on your vacation, Leo, about some guy whose security camera system was booted from an SSD, and it was freezing all the time, but not notifying him. So every time he checked on it, it had frozen, and he didn't know when, but all he was doing was rebooting it. Finally he ran SpinRite, and of course no more freezes, which was fortunate because some time afterwards some bad guy was caught on camera stealing stuff from his front yard, and he was able, thanks to the fact that it hadn't crashed, to provide the video to the local sheriffs, who arrested the guy, and he was now behind bars.
STEVE: So again, SpinRite didn't show that it fixed anything, but it did fix whatever the problem was. And we've talked about how that can often be the case. My guess is that McAfee was doing some routine background scanning of the system, trying to do its AV stuff, and hitting some spot on the SSD that was giving it some heartburn, or it was reading the data wrong or whatever. And so even though SpinRite didn't raise any flags, because we know that error correction is not perfect, it's sort of like parity, “parity” meaning that there's an extra bit which forces all the bits to have even parity. If one bit is wrong, then the parity is incorrect. If two bits are wrong, then the parity is correct again, even though they're two wrong bits.
Well, it turns out that error correction is good in the same way, but not perfect. And SpinRite is able to not get fooled that way and essentially able to correct problems that the drive itself doesn't even see. And so it often does that, doesn't report anything because it and the drive fixed the problem, yet the problem goes away anyway. So a nice side effect of running SpinRite on a drive where something seems a little flaky, and then the flakes are gone afterwards.
And the last story that I wanted to share is a tip of the hat to Cloudflare. We've got a bunch of friends over there. They're doing great work. We've covered that they did the 184.108.40.206 DNS service. They're offering DNS, both over HTTPS and over UDP TLS, known as DTLS. So they're very privacy and security conscious. So that allows, if you have a DNS client which is able to do DNS over HTTPS, and we're seeing some web browsers that are beginning to offer that option, the point being that, if you're really concerned about privacy, it's one thing, as I was mentioning before in a different context, it's one thing to encrypt your communications with a remote website. But if somebody is sniffing your traffic and seeing the DNS queries that are going to your DNS server, well, they know where you're going still. They may not be able to see what you're saying to that person, but as we know it's very powerful when, for example, say that you're a bad guy and trying to keep your network of other bad guys secret.
Well, if law enforcement is able just to see, to build a graph of connectivity of who's talking to who, that can be leveraged into some very powerful use. And similarly, if you are an oppressive government that is looking at who some known dissidents are talking to, well, even though they're not able to see what you're saying to each other, they're able to uncover a network. And there are many valid uses for wanting to keep the metadata of your communications private. DNS naturally, because it's not an inherently encrypted protocol, leaks that.
Okay. So what do you do? You encrypt your DNS. There's still a problem, though. And this is a problem that has not yet, until tentatively just now, been solved, even with TLS v1.3 that's the latest version of TLS. And that is the so-called SNI, the Server Name Indication. The idea is this is what's necessary for shared hosting environments. Over the years we've talked about how browsers establish an encrypted connection to a remote server. Normally what happens is the browser will look up the IP address for the service based on its domain name; will then connect to that IP address. And the way originally SSL and now TLS, the evolution of SSL work is that the server sends to the client its signed certificate, signed by a certificate authority that the browser, the HTTPS client, trusts. So since it trusts the CA because it's in the root store, it trusts the CA's signature that the CA has done due diligence in verifying the ownership of the certificate. And so that's how this is established.
The problem is that the certificate is sent to the client immediately after the TCP connection is negotiated as the first thing that the server sends in order for them to establish an encrypted connection. So how do you handle multi-hosting, where there may be many different domains, all accessible at the same IP? Well, for a while there were still browsers that did not understand SNI, that were unable to specify the server that they wanted to connect to. And there were servers that didn't understand it.
Well, we're past that now. All browsers that are in use are able to specify, as an addition to the information they're initially sending, the host name that they want to connect to. So the browser sends its so-called Client Hello packet, which in the old days just said hi, here's a nonce that I've just come up with for our communication. Here's the list of ciphers that I support. Take a look at that and send me back the Server Hello. Now that Client Hello, in an extension field, is able to say, “And this is the server I want to talk to at your end.” And that allows then this whatever it is that is answering the connection at the remote IP, it's able to look at the Client Hello, find that extension to the protocol, see the domain that the client is asking for, all among many that live at the same IP, and then select the certificate to use in the Server Hello to send back. So that's how we handle encrypted communications and the disambiguation of which service we're asking to connect to at a single IP. Once upon a time it was just by IP. But in shared hosting environments, that was a problem.
Okay. But because the client and server at that stage have not yet established encryption, we still have information leakage. And that has been discussed, I mean, extensively. And no one has come up with a solution that everybody likes. And the point is that that Client Hello is not encrypted and can't be encrypted, obviously, in an obvious fashion, because the server needs to be able to decrypt it. And the server needs to be able to decrypt it without any knowledge of the client in advance because otherwise somebody listening on the wire could also decrypt it, would be able to be in the same position of decryption. So that argues that the client has to have some information that works with something only the server has.
And what a small group of developers - Eric Rescorla, whose name I often see in Internet RFCs, he's at RTFM, Inc., which is his consultancy; a developer [Kazuho Oku] at Fastly; Chris Wood at Apple, who's also involved in Apple security stuff; and, not surprisingly, Nick Sullivan of Cloudflare - they got together and authored an RFC proposing a means of solving this problem. And Cloudflare has brought it up, and it's running sort of in a test mode. I mean, there isn't yet a large base of clients to connect to. But they're solving the chicken-and-egg problem by saying, well, we're going to put this online and invite people to connect to us.
And what they've done is clever. They've defined a record for DNS which provides the public key for the encryption of this information by the client that wants to protect the privacy of the name of the host to which it wants to connect in a multihosted environment. So a client that is aware of this extension to TLS 1.3, in the same way, probably at the same time that it does a lookup for the A or the AAAA record, which is the IP address of a site, could ask for the text records that also match that domain name. One of the newly defined text records is a means of encoding a public key.
So the multihosted site has placed a public key for which only it has the private key - notice we don't need any CAs in this model because it's using DNS to do this. And DNS is not yet safe enough to be used in place of CAs for trust. But in this model it provides the security guarantee that we need. It just provides a means of posting a public key which a client can then use to encrypt something that it's going to send to its target. And no man in the middle, no one listening to the traffic is able to crack that because they would not have the matching private key that never leaves the server.
So then the multihosted system sees a new type of extension because, in the same way that there's a Server Name Indication extension to the Client Hello, there's now an encrypted SNI, ESNI extension which these guys have defined, which has been encrypted under the public key which DNS is making available through a text record. They encrypt under that, send the Client Hello packet to the service, which is then able to decrypt that encrypted SNI extension, see who it is the client wants to connect to, select the proper certificate, and send it back.
So just, again, a tip of the hat to Cloudflare and Apple and Eric and Kazuho Oku at Fastly, the guys who put this RFC together, and to Cloudflare for bringing an implementation up and running. This was an actual announcement of the availability of this. Oh, and by the way, this coming Thursday, in two days, is Cloudflare's eighth birthday. They are eight years old in two days and just going a great job on the Internet for us all.
LEO: I agree. Well, and so are you. And this concludes this edition of Security Now!. Thank you, Steve. You can watch us do this show live every Tuesday, 1:30 Pacific, 4:30 Eastern, 20:30 UTC. You can watch at TWiT.tv/live. If you want to download a copy, Steve's got them all at GRC.com. While you're there, check out all of Steve's great free work and, of course, his bread and butter, SpinRite, the world's best hard drive recovery and maintenance utility. GRC.com. He also has transcripts, which is nice. A lot of people like to read along.
STEVE: I was joking with Jason over the fact that SpinRite fixes SSDs.
STEVE: And I said, you know, I don't know what I'm going to do because they don't spin. And he said, “Well, call it AllRite.”
STEVE: I was like, ooh, my god, that's good.
LEO: AllRite. AllRite, AllRite, AllRite. Get Matthew McConaughey to do the ad. AllRite, AllRite. You can get copies of the show, audio and video, from us at TWiT.tv/sn. Or subscribe on your favorite podcatcher, and you'll get it every week, right after the show, soon as it's available. We've got to edit it a little bit, put some stuff at the beginning, put some stuff at the end, but then you'll get it. Steve, have a great week.
STEVE: Will do. Glad you're back, my friend. And we'll talk next week, with the one-day warning for the Presidential Alert coming to all of our phones on Wednesday in the early afternoon East Coast, late morning for us on the West Coast.
LEO: We've got to get the word out because people are going to freak out.
STEVE: Actually, you probably want to be somewhere public.
LEO: Oh, yeah, because you'll hear it all loud and clear.
STEVE: Yeah, that would be cool. Neat.
LEO: Yeah. All right, Steve.
STEVE: Okay, buddy. Talk to you next week. Bye.
Copyright © 2018 by Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte. SOME RIGHTS RESERVED. This work is licensed for the good of the Internet Community under the Creative Commons License v2.5. See the following Web page for details: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/.