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<h2 align="left"><font size="5">Immanuel Kant<br>
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch</font></h2>

<h3 align="left"><font size="4">1795</font></h3>

<hr>

<p align="center"><font size="3">PERPETUAL PEACE</font></p>

<p align="left"><font size="3">Whether this satirical inscription on a Dutch innkeeper's
sign upon which a burial ground was painted had for its object mankind in general, or the
rulers of states in particular, who are insatiable of war, or merely the philosophers who
dream this sweet dream, it is not for us to decide. But one condition the author of this
essay wishes to lay down. The practical politician assumes the attitude of looking down
with great self-satisfaction on the political theorist as a pedant whose empty ideas in no
way threaten the security of the state, inasmuch as the state must proceed on empirical
principles; so the theorist is allowed to play his game without interference from the
worldly-wise statesman. Such being his attitude, the practical politician--and this is the
condition I make--should at least act consistently in the case of a conflict and not
suspect some danger to the state in the political theorist's opinions which are ventured
and publicly expressed without any ulterior purpose. By this <i>clausula</i> <i>salvatoria
</i>the author desires formally and emphatically to deprecate herewith any malevolent
interpretation which might be placed on his words.</font></p>

<h3 align="center"><font size="4">SECTION I</font></h3>

<p align="center"><font size="3">CONTAINING THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES FOR PERPETUAL PEACE
AMONG STATES</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><i>1. &quot;No Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which</i> <i>There
Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for </i>a <i>Future</i> <i>War&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">Otherwise a treaty would be only a truce, a suspension of hostilities
but not peace, which means the end of all hostilities--so much so that even to attach the
word &quot;perpetual&quot; to it is a dubious pleonasm. The causes for making future wars
(which are perhaps unknown to the contracting parties) are without exception annihilated
by the treaty of peace, even if they should be dug out of dusty documents by acute
sleuthing. When one or both parties to a treaty of peace, being too exhausted to continue
warring with each other, make a tacit reservation (<i>reservatio mentalis) </i>in regard
to old claims to be elaborated only at some more favorable opportunity in the future, the
treaty is made in bad faith, and we have an artifice worthy of the casuistry of a Jesuit.
Considered by itself, it is beneath the dignity of a sovereign, just as the readiness to
indulge in this kind of reasoning is unworthy of the dignity of his minister. </font></p>

<p><font size="3">But if, in consequence of enlightened concepts of statecraft, the glory
of the state is placed in its continual aggrandizement by whatever means, my conclusion
will appear merely academic and pedantic.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">2. <i>&quot;No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come </i>under <i>the
Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation&quot; </i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property (<i>patrimonium</i>).
It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose except the
state itself. It is a trunk with its own roots. But to incorporate it into another state,
like a graft, is to destroy its existence as a moral person, reducing it to a thing; such
incorporation thus contradicts the idea of the original contract without which no right
over a people can be conceived.<a href="#fn1">1</a></font></p>

<p><font size="3">Everyone knows to what dangers Europe, the only part of the world where
this manner of acquisition is known, has been brought, even down to the most recent times,
by the presumption that states could espouse one another; it is in part a new kind of
industry for gaining ascendancy by means of family alliances and without expenditure of
forces, and in part a way of extending one's domain. Also the hiring-out of troops by one
state to another, so that they can be used against an enemy not common to both, is to be
counted under this principle; for in this manner the subjects, as though they were things
to be manipulated at pleasure, are used and also used up.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">3. <i>&quot;Standing Armies </i>(miles perpetuus) <i>Shall in Time Be
Totally Abolished&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">For they incessantly menace other states by their readiness to appear at
all times prepared for war; they incite them to compete with each other in the number of
armed men, and there is no limit to this. For this reason, the cost of peace finally
becomes more oppressive than that of a short war, and consequently a standing army is
itself a cause of offensive war waged in order to relieve the state of this burden. Add to
this that to pay men to kill or to be killed seems to entail using them as mere machines
and tools in the hand of another (the state), and this is hardly compatible with the
rights of mankind in our own person. But the periodic and voluntary military exercises of
citizens who thereby secure themselves and their country against foreign aggression are
entirely different. </font></p>

<p><font size="3">The accumulation of treasure would have the same effect, for, of the
three powers--the power of armies, of alliances, and of money--the third is perhaps the
most dependable weapon. Such accumulation of treasure is regarded by other states as a
threat of war, and if it were not for the difficulties in learning the amount, it would
force the other state to make an early attack.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><i>4. &quot;National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the
External Friction of States&quot; </i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">This expedient of seeking aid within or without the state is above
suspicion when the purpose is domestic economy (e.g., the improvement of roads, new
settlements, establishment of stores against unfruitful years, etc.). But as an opposing
machine in the antagonism of powers, a credit system which grows beyond sight and which is
yet a safe debt for the present requirements--because all the creditors do not require
payment at one time--constitutes a dangerous money power. This ingenious invention of a
commercial people [England] in this century is dangerous because it is a war treasure
which exceeds the treasures of all other states; it cannot be exhausted except by default
of taxes (which is inevitable), though it can be long delayed by the stimulus to trade
which occurs through the reaction of credit on industry and commerce. This facility in
making war, together with the inclination to do so on the part of rulers--an inclination
which seems inborn in human nature--is thus a great hindrance to perpetual peace.
Therefore, to forbid this credit system must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace
all the more because it must eventually entangle many innocent states in the inevitable
bankruptcy and openly harm them. They are therefore justified in allying themselves
against such a state and its measures.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><i>5. &quot;No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution</i> <i>or
Government</i> <i>of Another State&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">For what is there to authorize it to do so? The offense, perhaps, which
a state gives to the subjects of another state? Rather the example of the evil into which
a state has fallen because of its lawlessness should serve as a warning. Moreover, the bad
example which one free person affords another as a <i>scandalum acceptum </i>is not an
infringement of his rights. But it would be quite different if a state, by internal
rebellion, should fall into two parts, each of which pretended to be a separate state
making claim to the whole. To lend assistance to one of these cannot be considered an
interference in the constitution of the other state (for it is then in a state of anarchy)
. But so long as the internal dissension has not come to this critical point, such
interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of an independent people
struggling with its internal disease; hence it would itself be an offense and would render
the autonomy of all states insecure.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">6. <i>&quot;No State Shall,</i> <em>during</em> <i>War, Permit Such Acts
of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible: Such
Are the Em</i><em>ployment</em> <i>of Assassins (</i>percussore<i>s), Poisoners </i>(venefici<i>),
Breach of Capitulation, and Incitement to Treason</i> (perduellio) in <i>the Opposing
State&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">These are dishonorable stratagems. For some confidence in the character
of the enemy must remain even in the midst of war, as otherwise no peace could be
concluded and the hostilities would degenerate into a war of extermination (<i>bellum
internecinum</i>). War, however, is only the sad recourse in the state of nature (where
there is no tribunal which could judge with the force of law) by which each state asserts
its right by violence and in which neither party can be adjudged unjust (for that would
presuppose a juridical decision); in lieu of such a decision, the issue of the conflict
(as if given by a so-called &quot;judgment of God&quot;) decides on which side justice
lies. But between states no punitive war (<i>bellum punitivum</i>) is conceivable, because
there is no relation between them of master and servant. </font></p>

<p><font size="3">It follows that a war of extermination, in which the destruction of both
parties and of all justice can result, would permit perpetual peace only in the vast
burial ground of the human race. Therefore, such a war and the use of all means leading to
it must be absolutely forbidden. But that the means cited do inevitably lead to it is
clear from the fact that these infernal arts, vile in themselves, when once used would not
long be confined to the sphere of war. Take, for instance, the use of spies <i>(uti
exploratoribus). </i>In this, one employs the infamy of others (which can never be
entirely eradicated) only to encourage its persistence even into the state of peace, to
the undoing of the very spirit of peace.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Although the laws stated are objectively, i.e., in so far as they
express the intention of rulers, mere prohibitions <i>(leges prohibitivae), </i>some of
them are of that strict kind which hold regardless of circumstances <i>(leges strictae) </i>and
which demand prompt execution. Such are Nos. 1, 5, and 6. Others, like Nos. 2, 3, and 4,
while not exceptions from the rule of law, nevertheless are sub- jectively broader <i>(leges
latae) </i>in respect to their observation, containing permission to delay their execution
without, however, losing sight of the end. This permission does not authorize, under No.
2, for example, delaying until doomsday (or, as Augustus used to say, ad <i>calendas
Graecas) </i>the re-establishment of the freedom of states which have been deprived of
it--i.e., it does not permit us to fail to do it, but it allows a delay to prevent
precipitation which might injure the goal striven for. For the prohibition concerns only
the manner of acquisition which is no longer permitted, but not the possession, which,
though not bearing a requisite title of right, has nevertheless been held lawful in all<b>
</b>states by the public opinion of the time (the time of the putative acquisition).<a
href="#fn2">2.</a> </font></p>

<h3 align="center"><font size="3">SECTION II</font></h3>

<p align="center"><font size="3">CONTAINING THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES<br>
FOR PERPETUAL PEACE AMONG STATES&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural
state <i>(status naturalis); </i>the natural state is one of war. This does not always
mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of peace,
therefore, must be <i>established, </i>for in order to be secured against hostility it is
not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless this security is
pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state), each may
treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.<a href="#fn3">3</a>
&nbsp;</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="3">FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="3">&nbsp;<i>&quot;The Civil Constitution of Every State
Should Be Republican&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">The only constitution which derives from the idea of the original
compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the
republican. <a href="#fn4">4</a> This constitution is established, firstly, by principles
of the freedom of the members of a society (as men); secondly, by principles of dependence
of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and, thirdly, by the law of their
equality (as citizens). The republican constitution, therefore, is, with respect to law,
the one which is the original basis of every form of civil constitution. The only question
now is: Is it also the one which can lead to perpetual peace?</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin (having
sprung from the pure source of the concept of law), also gives a favorable prospect for
the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the
citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this
constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be
very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities
of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from
their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to
fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would
embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the
future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which
the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to
decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a
member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his
country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on
a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the
justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide
it.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">In order not to confuse the republican constitution with the democratic
(as is commonly done), the following should be noted. The forms of a state <i>(civitas) </i>can
be divided either according to the persons who possess the sovereign power or according to
the mode of administration exercised over the people by the chief, whoever he may be. The
first is properly called the form of sovereignty (<em>forma im</em><i>perii), </i>and
there are only three possible forms of it: autocracy, in which one, aristocracy, in which
some associated together, or democracy, in which all those who constitute society, possess
sovereign power. They may be characterized, respectively, as the power of a monarch, of
the nobility, or of the people. The second division is that by the form of government (<em>forma</em>
<i>regiminis) </i>and is based on the way in which the state makes use of its power; this
way is based on the constitution, which is the act of the general will through which the
many persons become one nation. In this respect government is either republican or
despotic. Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the executive
power (the administration) from the legislative; despotism is that of the autonomous
execution by the state of laws which it has itself decreed. Thus in a despotism the public
will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three forms of the state, that
of democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an
executive power in which &quot;all&quot; decide for or even against one who does not
agree; that is, &quot;all,&quot; who are not quite all, decide, and this is a
contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Every form of government which is not representative is, properly
speaking, without form. The legislator can unite in one and the same person his function
as legislative and as executor of his will just as little as the universal of the major
premise in a syllogism can also be the subsumption of the particular under the universal
in the minor. And even though the other two constitutions are always defective to the
extent that they do leave room for this mode of administration, it is at least possible
for them to assume a mode of government conforming to the spirit of a representative
system (as when Frederick II at least <i>said </i>he was merely the first servant of the
state).<a href="#fn5">5</a> On the other hand, the democratic mode of government makes
this impossible, since everyone wishes to be master. Therefore, we can say: the smaller
the personnel of the government (the smaller the number of rulers), the greater is their
representation and the more nearly the constitution approaches to the possibility of
republicanism; thus the constitution may be expected by gradual reform finally to raise
itself to republicanism. For these reasons it is more difficult for an aristocracy than
for a monarchy to achieve the one completely juridical constitution, and it is impossible
for a democracy to do so except by violent revolution.&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The mode of governments, <a href="#fn6">6</a> however, is incomparably
more important to the people than the form of sovereignty, although much depends on the
greater or lesser suitability of the latter to the end of [good] government. To conform to
the concept of law, however, government must have a representative form, and in this
system only a republican mode of government is possible; without it, government is
despotic and arbitrary, whatever the constitution may be. None of the ancient so-called
&quot;republics&quot; knew this system, and they all finally and inevitably degenerated
into despotism under the sovereignty of one, which is the most bearable of all forms of
despotism.&nbsp;</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="2">&nbsp;SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR A PERPETUAL PEACE</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="2">&nbsp;</font><font size="3"><i>&quot;The Law of Nations
Shall be </i><em>Founded on </em><i>a Federation of Free States&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">Peoples, as states, like individuals, may be judged to injure one
another merely by their coexistence in the state of nature (i.e., while independent of
external laws). Each of then, may and should for the sake of its own security demand that
the others enter with it into a constitution similar to the civil constitution, for under
such a constitution each can be secure in his right. This would be a league of nations,
but it would not have to be a state consisting of nations. That would be contradictory,
since a state implies the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying),
i.e., the people, and many nations in one state would then constitute only one nation.
This contradicts the presupposition, for here we have to weigh the rights of nations
against each other so far as they are distinct states and not amalgamated into one.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">When we see the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom,
preferring ceaseless combat to subjection to a lawful constraint which they might
establish, and thus preferring senseless freedom to rational freedom, we regard it with
deep contempt as barbarity, rudeness, and a brutish degradation of humanity. Accordingly,
one would think that civilized people (each united in a state) would hasten all the more
to escape, the sooner the better, from such a depraved condition. But, instead, each state
places its majesty (for it is absurd to speak of the majesty of the people) in being
subject to no external juridical restraint, and the splendor of its sovereign consists in
the fact that many thousands stand at his command to sacrifice themselves for something
that does not concern them and without his needing to place himself in the least danger.<a
href="#fn7">7</a> The chief difference between European and American savages lies in the
fact that many tribes of the latter have been eaten by their enemies, while the former
know how to make better use of their conquered enemies than to dine off them; they know
better how to use them to increase the number of their subjects and thus the quantity of
instruments for even more extensive wars.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">When we consider the perverseness of human nature which is nakedly
revealed in the uncontrolled relations between nations (this perverseness being veiled in
the state of civil law by the constraint exercised by government), we may well be
astonished that the word &quot;law&quot; has not yet been banished from war politics as
pedantic, and that no state has yet been bold enough to advocate this point of view. Up to
the present, Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and many other irritating comforters have
been cited in justification of war, though their code, philosophically or diplomatically
formulated, has not and cannot have the least legal force, because states as such do not
stand under a common external power. There is no instance on record that a state has ever
been moved to desist from its purpose because of arguments backed up by the testimony of
such great men. But the homage which each state pays (at least in words) to the concept of
law proves that there is slumbering in man an even greater moral disposition to become
master of the evil principle in himself (which he cannot disclaim) and to hope for the
same from others. Otherwise the word &quot;law&quot; would never be pronounced by states
which wish to war upon one another; it would be used only ironically, as a Gallic prince
interpreted it when he said, &quot;It is the prerogative which nature has given the
stronger that the weaker should obey him.&quot;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">States do not plead their cause before a tribunal; war alone is their
way of bringing suit. But by war and its favorable issue, in victory, right is not
decided, and though by a treaty of peace this particular war is brought to an end, the
state of war, of always finding a new pretext to hostilities, is not terminated. Nor can
this be declared wrong, considering the fact that in this state each is the judge of his
own case. Notwithstanding, the obligation which men in a lawless condition have under the
natural law, and which requires them to abandon the state of nature, does not quite apply
to states under the law of nations, for as states they already have an internal juridical
constitution and have thus outgrown compulsion from others to submit to a more extended
lawful constitution according to their ideas of right. This is true in spite of the fact
that reason, from its throne of supreme moral legislating authority, absolutely condemns
war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, even though peace cannot
be established or secured except by a compact among nations.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">For these reasons there must be a league of a particular kind, which can
be called a league of peace <i>(foedus paci</i><em>ficum</em>), and which would be
distinguished from a treaty of peace (<em>pactum</em> <i>pacis) </i>by the fact that the
latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to make an end of all wars forever.
This league does not tend to any dominion over the power of the state but only to the
maintenance and security of the freedom of the state itself and of other states in league
with it, without there being any need for them to submit to civil laws and their
compulsion, as men in a state of nature must submit.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of federation, which
should gradually spread to all states and thus lead to perpetual peace, can be proved. For
if fortune directs that a powerful and enlightened people can make itself a republic,
which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace, this gives a fulcrum to the
federation with other states so that they may adhere to it and thus secure freedom under
the idea of the law of nations. By more and more such associations, the federation may be
gradually extended.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">We may readily conceive that a people should say, &quot;There ought to
be no war among us, for we want to make ourselves into a state; that is, we want to
establish a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary power which will reconcile our
differences peaceably.&quot; But when this state says, &quot;There ought to be no war
between myself and other states, even though I acknowledge no supreme legislative power by
which our rights are mutually guaranteed,&quot; it is not at all clear on what I can base
my confidence in my own rights unless it is the free federation, the surrogate of the
civil social order, which reason necessarily associates with the concept of the law of
nations--assuming that something is really meant by the latter.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The concept of a law of nations as a right to make war does not really
mean anything, because it is then a law of deciding what is right by unilateral maxims
through force and not by universally valid public laws which restrict the freedom of each
one. The only conceivable meaning of such a law of nations might be that it serves men
right who are so inclined that they should destroy each other and thus find perpetual
peace in the vast grave that swallows both the atrocities and their perpetrators. For
states in their relation to each other, there cannot be any reasonable way out of the
lawless condition which entails only war except that they, like individual men, should
give up their savage (lawless) freedom, adjust themselves to the constraints of public
law, and thus establish a continuously growing state consisting of various nations <i>(civitas
gentium), </i>which will ultimately include all the nations of the world. But under the
idea of the law of nations they do not wish this, and reject in practice what is correct
in theory. If all is not to be lost, there can be, then, in place of the positive idea of
a world republic, only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts war, endures,
spreads, and holds back the stream of those hostile passions which fear the law, though
such an alliance is in constant peril of their breaking loose again.<a href="#fn8">8</a> <em>Furor</em>
<i>impius intus </i>. . . <em>fremit horridus ore cruento</em> (Virgil).&nbsp;</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="3">THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR A PERPETUAL PEACE</font></p>

<p align="center"><font size="3">&nbsp;<i>&quot;The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be
Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality&quot;</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy
but of right. Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when
he arrives in the land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done
without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may
not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may
demand. A special beneficent agreement would be needed in order to give an outsider a
right to become a fellow inhabitant for a certain length of time. It is only a right of
temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by virtue of
their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot
infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each other.
Originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part of the earth.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Uninhabitable parts of the earth--the sea and the deserts--divide this
community of all men, but the ship and the camel (the desert ship) enable them to approach
each other across these unruled regions and to establish communication by using the common
right to the face of the earth, which belongs to human beings generally. The inhospitality
of the inhabitants of coasts (for instance, of the Barbary Coast) in robbing ships in
neighboring seas or enslaving stranded travelers, or the inhospitality of the inhabitants
of the deserts (for instance, the Bedouin Arabs) who view contact with nomadic tribes as
conferring the right to plunder them, is thus opposed to natural law, even though it
extends the right of hospitality, i.e., the privilege of foreign arrivals, no further than
to conditions of the possibility of seeking to communicate with the prior inhabitants. In
this way distant parts of the world can come into peaceable relations with each other, and
these are finally publicly established by law. Thus the human race can gradually be
brought closer and closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">But to this perfection compare the inhospitable actions of the civilized
and especially of the commercial states of our part of the world. The injustice which they
show to lands and peoples they visit (which is equivalent to conquering them) is carried
by them to terrifying lengths. America, the lands inhabited by the Negro, the Spice
Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery considered by these civilized
intruders as lands without owners, for they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In East
India (Hindustan), under the pretense of establishing economic undertakings, they brought
in foreign soldiers and used them to oppress the natives, excited widespread wars among
the various states, spread famine, rebellion, perfidy, and the whole litany of evils which
afflict mankind.&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">China </font><font size="2"><a href="#fn9">9</a> </font><font size="3">and
Japan (Nippon), who have had experience with such guests, have wisely refused them entry,
the former permitting their approach to their shores but not their entry, while the latter
permit this approach to only one European people, the Dutch, but treat them like
prisoners, not allowing them any communication with the inhabitants. The worst of this
(or, to speak with the moralist, the best) is that all these outrages profit them nothing,
since all these commercial ventures stand on the verge of collapse, and the Sugar Islands,
that place of the most refined and cruel slavery, produces no real revenue except
indirectly, only serving a not very praiseworthy purpose of furnishing sailors for war
fleets and thus for the conduct of war in Europe. This service is rendered to powers which
make a great show of their piety, and, while they drink injustice like water, they regard
themselves as the elect in point of orthodoxy.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has
developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world, the
idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a
supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the
maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace. One cannot
flatter oneself into believing one can approach this peace except under the condition
outlined here.</font></p>

<p><a href="http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/firstsup.htm"><font size="3">Go to
the First Supplement, &quot;Of the Guarantee for Perpetual Peace&quot;</font></a></p>

<p><a href="http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/2ndsup.htm"><font size="3">Go the
the Second Supplement, &quot;Secret Article for Perpetual Peace&quot;</font></a></p>

<p><a href="http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/append1.htm"><font size="3">Go to
Appendix I, &quot;On the Opposition Between Morality and Politics With Respect to
Perpetual Peace&quot;</font></a></p>

<p><a href="http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant6.htm"><font size="3">Go to
Appendix II, &quot;Of the Harmony Which the Transcendental Concept of Public Right
Established Between Morality and Politics&quot;</font></a></p>

<hr>

<h3 align="center"><font size="4">Footnotes </font></h3>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn1">1.</a> A hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be
inherited by another state, but the right to govern it can be inherited by another
physical person. The state thereby acquires a ruler, but he, as a ruler (i.e., as one
already possessing another realm), does not acquire the state.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn2">2.</a> It has not without cause hitherto been doubted
whether besides the commands <i>(leges praeceptivae) </i>and prohibitions <i>(leges
prohibitivae) </i>there could also be permissive laws <i>(leges permissivae) </i>of pure
reason. For laws as such contain a principle of objective practical necessity, while
permission implies a principle of the practical contingency of certain actions. Hence a
law of permission would imply constraint to an action to do that to which no one can be
constrained. If the object of the law has the same meaning in both cases, this is a
contradiction. But in permissive law, which is in question here, the prohibition refers
only to the future mode of acquisition of a right (e.g., by succession), while the
permission annuls this prohibition only with reference to the present possession. This
possession, though only putative, may be held to be just <i>(possessio putative) </i>in
the transition from the state of nature to a civil state, by virtue of a permissive law
included under natural law, even though it is [strictly] illegal. But, as soon as it is
recognized as illegal in the state of nature, a similar mode of acquisition in the
subsequent civil state (after this transition has occurred) is forbidden, and this right
to continuing possession would not hold if such a presumptive acquisition had taken place
in the civil state. For in this case it would be an infringement which would have to cease
as soon as its illegality was discovered. </font></p>

<p><font size="3">I have wished only to call the attention of the teachers of natural law
to the concept of a <i>lex permissive, </i>which systematic reason affords, particularly
since in civil (statute) law use is often made of it. But in the ordinary use of it, there
is this difference: prohibitive law stands alone, while permission is not introduced into
it as a limiting condition (as it should be) but counted among the exceptions to it. Then
it is said, &quot;This or that is forbidden, except Nos. 1, 2, 3,&quot; and so on
indefinitely. These exceptions are added to the law only as an afterthought required by
our groping around among cases as they arise, and not by any principle. Otherwise the
conditions would have had to be introduced into the formula of the prohibition, and in
this way it would itself have become a permissive law. It is, therefore, unfortunate that
the subtle question proposed by the wise and acute Count von Windischgrätz was never
answered and soon consigned to oblivion, because it insisted on the point here discussed.
For the possibility of a formula similar to those of mathematics is the only legitimate
criterion of a consistent legislation, and without it the so-called <i>ius certum</i> must
always remain a pious wish. Otherwise we shall have merely general laws (which apply to a
great number of cases), but no universal laws (which apply to all cases) as the concept of
law seems to requires.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn3">3.</a> We ordinarily assume that no one may act inimically
toward another except when he has been actively injured by the other. This is quite
correct if both are under civil law, for, by entering into such a state, they afford each
other the requisite security through the sovereign which has power over both. Man (or the
people) in the state of nature deprives me of this security and injures me, if he is near
me, by this mere status of his, even though he does not injure me actively (facto); he
does so by the lawlessness of his condition <i>(statu iniusto) </i>which constantly
threatens me. Therefore, I can compel him either to enter with me into a state of civil
law or to remove himself from my neighborhood. The postulate which is basic to all the
following articles is: All men who can reciprocally influence each other must stand under
some civil constitution.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Every juridical constitution which concerns the person who stands under
it is one of the following:&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3">(1) The constitution conforming to the civil law of men in a nation <i>(ius
civitatis).</i></font></p>

<p align="left"><font size="3">(2) The constitution conforming to the law of nations in
their relation to one another (<em>ius gentium</em>).</font></p>

<p><font size="3">(3) The constitution conforming to the law of world citizenship, so far
as men and states are considered as citizens of a universal state of men, in their
external mutual relationships <i>(ius cosmopoliticum).</i></font></p>

<p><font size="3">This division is not arbitrary, being necessary in relation to the idea
of perpetual peace. For if only one state were related to another by physical influence
and were yet in a state of nature, war would necessarily follow, and our purpose here is
precisely to free ourselves of war.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn4">4.</a> Juridical (and hence) external freedom cannot be
defined, as is usual, by the privilege of doing anything one wills so long as he does not
injure another. For what is a privilege? It is the possibility of an action so far as one
does not injure anyone by it. Then the definition would read: Freedom is the possibility
of those actions by which one does no one an injury. One does another no injury (he may do
as he pleases) only if he does another no injury--an empty tautology. Rather, my external
(juridical) freedom is to be defined as follows: It is the privilege to lend obedience to
no external laws except those to which I could have given consent. Similarly, external
(juridical) equality in a state is that relationship among the citizens in which no one
can lawfully bind another without at the same time subjecting himself to the law by which
he also can be bound. No definition of juridical dependence is needed, as this already
lies in the concept of a state's constitution as such.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">The validity of these inborn rights, which are inalienable and belong
necessarily to humanity, is raised to an even higher level by the principle of the
juridical relation of man to higher beings, for, if he believes in them, he regards
himself by the same principles as a citizen of a supersensuous world. For in what concerns
my freedom, I have no obligation with respect to divine law, which can be acknowledged by
my reason alone, except in so far as I could have given my consent to it. Indeed, it is
only through the law of freedom of my own reason that I frame a concept of the divine
will. With regard to the most sublime reason in the world that I can think of, with the
exception of God--say, the great Aeon--when I do my duty in my post as he does in his,
there is no reason under the law of equality why obedience to duty should fall only to me
and the right to command only to him. The reason why this principle of equality does not
pertain to our relation to God (as the principle of freedom does) is that this Being is
the only one to which the concept of duty does not apply.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">But with respect to the right of equality of all citizens as subjects,
the question of whether a hereditary nobility may be tolerated turns upon the answer to
the question as to whether the pre-eminent rank granted by the state to one citizen over
another ought to precede merit or follow it. Now it is obvious that, if rank is associated
with birth, it is uncertain whether merit (political skill and integrity) will also
follow; hence it would be as if a favorite without any merit were given command. The
general will of the people would never agree to this in the original contract, which is
the principle of all law, for a nobleman is not necessarily a noble man. With regard to
the nobility of office (as we might call the rank of the higher magistracy) which one must
earn by merit, this rank does not belong to the person as his property; it belongs to his
post, and equality is not thereby infringed, because when a man quits his office he
renounces the rank it confers and re-enters into the class of his fellows.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn5">5.</a> The lofty epithets of &quot;the Lord's
anointed...... the executor of the divine will on earth,&quot; and &quot;the vicar of
God,&quot; which have been lavished on sovereigns, have been frequently censured as crude
and intoxicating flatteries. But this seems to me without good reason. Far from inspiring
a monarch with pride, they should rather render him humble, providing he possesses some
intelligence (which we must assume). They should make him reflect that he has taken an
office too great for man, an office which is the holiest God has ordained on earth, to be
the trustee of the rights of men, and that he must always stand in dread of having in some
way injured this &quot;apple of God's eye.&quot;</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn6">6.</a> Mallet du Pan, in his pompous but empty and hollow
language, pretends to have become convinced, after long experience, of the truth of Pope's
well-known saying:</font></p>

<blockquote>
  <blockquote>
    <blockquote>
      <p><font size="3">&quot;For forms of government let fools contest:<br>
      Whate'er is best administered, is best.&quot;</font></p>
    </blockquote>
  </blockquote>
</blockquote>

<p><font size="3">If that means that the best-administered state is the state that is best
administered, he has, to make use of Swift's expression, &quot;cracked a nut to come at a
maggot.&quot; But if it means that the best-administered state also has the best mode of
government, i.e., the best constitution, then it is thoroughly wrong, for examples of good
governments prove nothing about the form of government. Whoever reigned better than a
Titus and a Marcus Aurelius? Yet one was succeeded by a Domitian and the other by a
Commodus. This could never have happened under a good constitution, for their unworthiness
for this post was known early enough and also the power of the ruler was sufficient to
have excluded them.</font></p>

<p align="left"><font size="3"><a name="fn7">7.</a> A Bulgarian prince gave the following
answer to the Greek emperor who good-naturedly suggested that they settle their difference
by a duel: &quot;A smith who has tongs won't pluck the glowing iron from the fire with his
bare hands.</font><font size="4">&quot;&nbsp;</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn8">8.</a> It would not ill become a people that has just
terminated a war to decree, besides a day of thanksgiving, a day of fasting in order to
ask heaven, in the name of the state, for forgiveness for the great iniquity which the
human race still goes on to perpetuate in refusing to submit to a lawful constitution in
their relation to other peoples, preferring, from pride in their independence, to make use
of the barbarous means of war even though they are not able to attain what is sought,
namely, the rights of a single state. The thanksgiving for victory won during the war, the
hymns which are sung to the God of Hosts (in good Israelitic manner), stand in equally
sharp contrast to the moral idea of the Father of Men. For they not only show a sad enough
indifference to the way in which nations seek their rights, but in addition express a joy
in having annihilated a multitude of men or their happiness.</font></p>

<p><font size="3"><a name="fn9">9.</a>To call this great empire by the name it gives
itself, namely &quot;China&quot; and not &quot;Sina&quot; or anything like that, we have
only to refer to [A.] Georgi, <em>Alphabetum Tibetanum</em>, pp. 651-54, especially note
b. According to the note of Professor [Johann Eberhard] Fischer of Petersburg, there is no
definite word used in that country as its name; the most usual word is &quot;Kin,&quot;
i.e., gold (which the Tibetans call &quot;Ser&quot;). Accordingly, the emperor is called
&quot;the king of gold,&quot; that is, king of the most splendid country in the world. In
the empire itself, this word may be pronounced <em>Chin</em>, while because of the
'guttural sound the Italian missionaries may have called it <em>Kin</em>.--It is clear
that what the Romans called the &quot;Land of Seres&quot; was China; the silk, however,
was sent to Europe across Greater Tibet (through Lesser Tibet, Bukhara, Persia, and then
on).</font></p>

<p><font size="3">This suggests many reflections concerning the antiquity of this
wonderful state, in comparison with that of Hindustan at the time of its union with Tibet
and thence with Japan. We see, on the contrary, that the name &quot;Sina&quot; or
&quot;Tshina,&quot; said to have been used by the neighbors of the country, suggests
nothing.</font></p>

<p><font size="3">Perhaps we can also explain the very ancient but never well-known
intercourse of Europe with Tibet by considering the shout, ('<em>Konx Ompax</em>'), of the
hierophants in the Eleusinian mysteries, as we learn from Hysichius (cf. <i>Travels of the
Young Anacharsis, </i>Part V, p. 447 ff.). For, according to Georgi, <i>op. cit., </i>the
word <em>Concoia</em> means God, which has a striking resemblance to <em>Konx</em>. <i>Pah-cio
(ibid., </i>520), which the Greeks may well have pronounced pax, means the <em>promulgator
legis</em>, divinity pervading the whole of nature (also called <em>Cencresi</em>, p.
177). <em>Om</em>, however, which La Croze translates as <em>benedictus</em>
(&quot;blessed&quot;), when applied to divinity perhaps means &quot;the beatified&quot;
(p. 507). P. Franz Orazio often asked the Lamas of Tibet what they understood by
&quot;God&quot; (<em>Concoia</em>) and always got the answer, &quot;It is the assembly of
saints&quot; (i.e., the assembly of the blessed ones who, according to the doctrine of
rebirth, finally, after many wanderings through bodies of all kinds, have returned to God,
or <em>Burchane</em>; that is to say, they are transmigrated souls, beings to be
worshiped, p. 223). That mysterious expression <em>Konx Ompax </em>may well mean &quot;the
holy&quot; (<em>Konx</em>), the blessed (<em>Om</em>), the wise (<em>Pax</em>), the
supreme being pervading the world (nature personified). Its use in the Greek mysteries may
indicate monotheism among the epopts in contrast to the polytheism of the people (though
Orazio scented atheism there). How that mysterious word came to the Greeks via Tibet can
perhaps be explained in this way; and the early traffic of Europe with China, also through
Tibet, and perhaps earlier than communication with Hindustan, is made probable.</font></p>
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