4 May 2004
Classifications:
(U) Unclassified
(S/NF) Secret, No Foreign
(S) Secret
U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse
Complete text of Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba
Updated: 7:09 p.m. ET May 04, 2004
The following is the text of the Taguba report with only the names of the
witnesses removed for the sake of privacy.
The report was prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba on alleged abuse of
prisoners by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the Abu Ghraib
Prison in Baghdad.
It was ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Joint Task Force-7,
the senior U.S. military official in Iraq, following persistent allegations
of human rights abuses at the prison.
The official name of the report is:
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References
…………………………………………………………
3
Background
………………………………………………………
6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations
In Iraq (MG Miller’s
Assessment).……….………………….. 8
IO Comments on MG Miller’s Assessment..……… 8
Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq (MG Ryder’s
Report)……………………………… 9
IO Comments on MG Ryder’s Report……………… 12
Preliminary Investigative Actions ………………..
12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse).
………………………… 15
Findings
………………………………………….
15
Recommendations
…………………………… 20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) …….. 22
Findings
………………………………………….
22
Recommendations.
………………………… 31
Part Three (Command Climate, Etc…). ……… 34
Findings
………………………………………
… 36
Recommendations ……
…………………… 44
Other Findings/Observations
……………………… 49
Conclusion
…………………………………………
………… 50
Annexes
…………………………………………………………
51
References
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August
1949
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, 12 August 1949
8. DOD Directive 5100.69, “DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other
Detainees,” 27 December 1972
9. DOD Directive 5100.77 “DOD Law of War Program,” 10 July 1979
10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition
5), 28 June 1994
11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6),
6 December 1994
12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees,
and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement
and Security Duties, 12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, 12 February
1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31 September 2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5 September
2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers,
11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999
31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August
2001
32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders’ Handbook, 4 March 2002
34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000
35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May
1994
36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985
38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Battalion
(IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Guard
Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police Escort
Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill
Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide for
MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March
1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1, Soldier’s
Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4,
Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, 30 September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations
in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba),
9 September 2003
50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald
J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment
of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF), 19 November 2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-Led Detention
Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December 2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, 12
October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations, 13 December
2003
56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial, 2002
Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S. Sanchez,
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander,
US Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the grade of
Major General (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within
the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation
of detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003
to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from
confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated systemic
problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear standards, proficiency,
and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing
inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and
performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command (CENTCOM),
MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that
the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG David
D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention
and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed
that the investigation should inquire into all facts and circumstances
surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed
that the investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses
as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and all-encompassing
inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX
3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio M.
Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation.
MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-6
into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations.
Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of maltreatment at
the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported
by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib
Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies,
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the
investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as
appropriate. (ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez’s request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade followed
the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee abuse committed by
members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units
are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON
to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initiated.
In addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition
Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include
Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD)
Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities. In
addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in
May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES
5-18, 34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual appointment
by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC
Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I selected
COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this
investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal General of the Army,
MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts in
the areas of detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD
Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq conducted
by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).
From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced
in strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG)
to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for
actionable intelligence. MG Miller’s team focused on three areas:
intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations;
and detention operations. MG Miller’s team used JTF-GTMO procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth analysis
of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003,
conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal, medical, and
automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested
a team of subject matter experts to assess, and make specific recommendations
concerning detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November
2003, MG Ryder personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX
19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ (MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller’s team was on the strategic
interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its
Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures
in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report
information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also
stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation.
(ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller’s Team recommended
that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the
Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that “sets the
conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of
internees/detainees.” Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller’s
team stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious collection of
intelligence. However, it also stated “it is essential that the guard
force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation
of the internees.” (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also concluded that Joint Strategic Interrogation
Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of active control of the
internees within the detention environment. The Miller Team also stated that
establishment of the Theater Joint Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC)
at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation
operations and result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated,
synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also observed that the application of emerging
strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new approaches
and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a legal review and
recommendations on internee interrogation operations by a dedicated Command
Judge Advocate is required to maximize interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX
20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO
operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for its
observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that the
intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different
than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other
detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi
criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be international
terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other
international terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller’s team that the “guard
force” be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful
exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the
recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that military police
“do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions.” The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby
military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent interviews
runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER’S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive review
of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and provided
recommendations addressing each of the following areas as requested by the
Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and
accountability
c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections system
d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-run
corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and sanitation
standards
g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law enforcement
and court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder’s team are
beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important findings
are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is
added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and
accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the various
detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection points and US monitored
Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently detailed use of force and other
standing operating procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
improper restraint techniques, detainee management, etc.) Though, there were
no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals
(generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security internees (generally
Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated
in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people in
a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion about handling,
processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer of information
between different categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R)
and corrections specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections
training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout
the Army, one currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the other
are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days
of training in detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed
self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell
moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections
System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight MP(I/R)
Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due
to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two Battalion HHCs in December
2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003,
the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and redeployed in January
2004. The 724thMP Battalion redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder
is scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP
Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
The units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component units
do not have an individual personnel replacement system to mitigate medical
losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months
of Federal active duty in a five-year period. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to CJTF-7
to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All detention
operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca,
TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its task
organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed
to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the
doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility
layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW population,
and not criminals or high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections of
the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is due to
specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to preclude
the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees,
and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, require military police
to provide an area for intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within
a facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom posited a template whereby military police actively set favorable
conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run counter
to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its
population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not
been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for
MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and
21-23)
6. MG Ryder’s Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term
and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD Policy.
The process of screening security internees should include intelligence findings,
interrogation results, and current threat assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur at
Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the screening
operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers securing the
compound, clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the
military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK security
mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi Theater
of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement operations in support
of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER’S REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder’s Team was to observe detention and
prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights issues, and
provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7
operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from US military
control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional Authority and eventually to
the Iraqi Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG Ryder’s
Team are thorough and precise and should be implemented immediately. (ANNEX
19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during
MG Ryder’s Team’s assessment are the very same issues that are
the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by
detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment. As will
be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of this report, I disagree
with the conclusion of MG Ryder’s Team in one critical aspect, that
being its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked to change
its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews. While clearly
the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions
for detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review
of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was done
at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion regarding the effect
of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence
within a facility, should not participate in Military Intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military Police should not be involved
with setting “favorable conditions” for subsequent interviews.
These actions, as will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run counter
to the smooth operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder’s Report and MG Miller’s
Report, my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of all
available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail
the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee abuses at detention
facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility.
We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements from military police and
military intelligence personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed
numerous photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility
personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos
are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th
MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal investigations and
disciplinary actions involving that command for the past several months.
(All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the CFLCC PMO
and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two individuals who are
experts in military police detention practices and training. These were LTC
Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United States Disciplinary
Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor,
US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received
the services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist
assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder’s and MG Miller’s Reports, the team
reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on
Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205thMI Brigade’s
Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility staff logs/journals and
numerous records of AR 15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)
on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and 94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day inspection
of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex
in order to become familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL Jerry
Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock,
Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,
and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team
visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with the
facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004,
at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions on approved
detention practices. We continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing
CID investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul
Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the applicable reference materials within
each team member’s area of expertise, and practiced investigative
techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate
witness lists, review existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and
collect potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness
attendance, force protection measures, and general logistics for the team’s
move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1 February 2004
between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th
MP Brigade Command, I directed that several critical witnesses who were preparing
to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be
interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and
conducted a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30).
We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15 February
we interviewed a number of witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February
we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of witnesses at that
location. From 18 February thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled
references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of
the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29
February we finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9
March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations
to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review.
The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on 3
March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations
of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL Jerry
Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have done a superb
job of investigating several complex and extremely disturbing incidents of
detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They conducted over 50 interviews
of witnesses, potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered
numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by
Military Police personnel on numerous occasions from October to December
2003. Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding
their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in this
abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of these
statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers,
NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as members
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working at the prison. We did
not believe it was necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who
had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted
those statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34,
35, and 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides security
of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional
Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports
other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the force protection/quality
of life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations
to secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was designated
by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November
2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic interrogations
for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA)
on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI
Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP Brigade is
responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock
1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was suspended
from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion
Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was
suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as
the Company Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding
detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP Battalion
and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib.
(ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski was the
Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse
of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military
police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320thMilitary Police
Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison
(BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness
statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic
evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and
videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal
prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not included
in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are available from
the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition
to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members
of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana
Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip
and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police
personnel included the following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked
feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions
for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked
for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being
photographed and videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head,
and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric
torture;
i. (S) Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged
to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing
him naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and
having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten
detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions provided
by several of the suspects, written statements provided by detainees, and
witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered
the pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX
26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company – Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company – Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company – Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company – Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the 205th
MI Brigade- Suspect
(Names deleted)
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following acts of
abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity
of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses (ANNEX
26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee
who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick.
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with
threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the following
detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible based on the clarity
of their statements and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa’eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings
found in MG Ryder’s Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators
and Other US Government Agency’s (OGA) interrogators actively requested
that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation
of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s Report, I find
that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed
to change facility procedures to “set the conditions” for MI
interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP personnel actually participated
in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I find
was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES
25 and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn statement
regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box with wires attached
to his fingers, toes, and penis, “that her job was to keep detainees
awake.” She stated that MI was talking to CPL Grainer. She stated: “MI
wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick’s job to do
things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn statement
as follows: “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being
made to do various things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we were
told that they had different rules and different SOP for treatment. I never
saw a set of rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier
in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers
would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would complain
(sic).” When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest
of the wings, SGT Davis stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners
and 1A/B are Military Intelligence (MI) holds.” When asked why he did
not inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “
Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside
the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing belongs
to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT Davis
also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates.
When asked what MI said he stated: “Loosen this guy up for us.”Make sure he has abad night.” “Make sure he gets the treatment.”
He claimed these comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally,
SGT Davis stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my understanding have
been giving Granier compliments on the way he has been handling the MI holds.
Example being statements like, “Good job, they’re breaking down
real fast. They answer every question. They’re giving out good information,
Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff like that.”
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were present when
any detainees were abused. He stated: “I saw them nude, but MI would
tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes.” He could
not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but commented that, “if
they wanted me to do that they needed to give me paperwork.” He was
later informed that “we could not do anything to embarrass the
prisoners.”
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was questioned
about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): “They
(detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were there
that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and SGT Frederick
ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what they did. They made
them do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump up and down,
throw water on them and made them some wet, called them all kinds of names
such as “gays” do they like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed
their hands together and their legs with shackles and started to stack them
on top of each other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will touch the
guy on tops butt.”
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a medic testified
that: “Cell 1A was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B
was used to house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During my tour
at the prison I observed that when the male detainees were first brought
to the facility, some of them were made to wear female underwear, which I
think was to somehow break them down.”
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom,
the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training
in detention/internee operations. I also find that very little instruction
or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8,
or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva
Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES
21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)
13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not communicating
with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident
of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers
from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp
Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had
abused a number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive
CID investigation determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion
had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from
Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these Soldiers
and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a
general court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski supported.
Despite this documented abuse, there is no evidence that BG Karpinski ever
attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that
such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum,
the commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident,
took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained regarding
detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline
Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts in
internment/resettlement operations, international and operational law,
information technology, facility management, interrogation and intelligence
gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct
comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved
in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7,
and subordinate units, be immediately provided with training by an
international/operational law attorney on the specific provisions of The
Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee
operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that
the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating
detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility commanders
ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War and notice of protections be made available in both English
and the detainees’ language and be prominently displayed in all detention
facilities. Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be
given the full opportunity to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation facility
commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
be required to read the SOPs and sign a document indicating that they have
read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder’s Assessment
Report, and my findings and recommendations in this investigation, all units
in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting internment/confinement/detainment
operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes,
to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee operations
in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has
been appointed by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to determine
the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to
the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC)
regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is
assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training and
knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and advise on matters
of detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses
as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events at
the Abu Ghraib Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment and
Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee
operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time period covered
in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee
operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca
Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee
operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on
4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with detainee
operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15
March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well being of
Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees,
as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW FM
3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis
of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the
800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness statements
in ANNEXES 45-91).
9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after in-processing
was inconsistent from detention facility to detention facility, compound
to compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to shift throughout
the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a “Criminal
Detainee In-Processing SOP” and a “Training Outline” for
transferring and releasing detainees, which appears to have been followed.
(ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the National
Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS)
as required by regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is
underutilized and often does not give a “real time” accurate picture
of the detainee population due to untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at the
Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created
“change sheet” to document the transfer of a detainee from one
location to another. For proper accountability, it is imperative that these
change sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated within 24
hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process would often take as long as
4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment
Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee manifest and
the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion
of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and
the S-3, MAJ David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the
lack of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39
and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at least
4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their operational
journals revealed that these accounts were often not done or not documented
by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication that accounting errors
or the loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate
corrective action by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP Battalion
conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound within a given
encampment did their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees
line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some moved all the
detainees to one end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the
other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band checks)
per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due
to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these checks were regularly
inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted non-doctrinal
terms such as “band checks,” “roll-ups,” and
“call-ups,” which contributed to the lapses in accountability and
confusion at the soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th Battalion
TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which
highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit. There was no indication
that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of command.
(Annex 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing TACSOPs
were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were
never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the
unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites. (Annexes
44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity,
implementation measures, and a system of checks and balances to ensure
compliance. (AnnexES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to develop
the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate
units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care appears to have
been made up as the operations developed with reliance on, and guidance from,
junior members of the unit who had civilian corrections experience. (Annex
21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R operations
prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and
throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27 escapes
or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout the 800th MP
Brigade’s AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the
substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it
is highly likely that there were several more unreported cases of escape
that were probably “written off” as administrative errors or otherwise
undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported
knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a work detail and
one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis
McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee
at the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then outran
the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade,
stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities,
which does not match the number derived from the investigation materials.
(ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are significantly
over their intended maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned
and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed to the poor living
conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses at the various facilities.
The overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability to identify and
segregate leaders in the detainee population who may be organizing escapes
and riots within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should not
be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest
in the detention facilities. There are currently three separate release
mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending
unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that their continued
detention is not warranted. Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released
after it has been determined that the detainee has no intelligence value,
and that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski
had signature authority to release detainees in this second category. Lastly,
detainees accused of committing “Crimes Against the Coalition,”
who are held throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be
released upon a determination that they are of no intelligence value and
no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition Forces. The release process
for this category of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate
Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski,
COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is
the “Detainee Release Authority” for detainees being held for
committing crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this
category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population,
and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski,
routinely denied the board’s recommendations to release detainees in
this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the requirements
for release. According to BG Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective
release process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the
facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted after
an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to have been
disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest
level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and none were provided.
(Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from various 15-6
Investigations concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were rubber
stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no
evidence that the majority of her orders directing the implementation of
substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up
by the command to verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings
and recommendations contained within their own investigations been analyzed
and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes,
accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES
5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention facility
at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas
that have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
are posted in English or in the language of the detainees at any of the detention
facilities in the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR, even after several investigations
had annotated the lack of this critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements
and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable work
ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the
Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with
contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they have facilitated
the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak’s Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation, CACI,
etc…), third country nationals, and local contractors do not appear
to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During
our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised free
access in the detainee area. Having civilians in various outfits (civilian
and DCUs) in and about the detainee area causes confusion and may have
contributed to the difficulties in the accountability process and with detecting
escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations
of the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, contended that
the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the
Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu
Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal observations, support
his contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES
45, 80, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee operations;
however, they have been unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in
rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this training. (Annexes
59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade
have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies
(OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the
reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees “ghost detainees.”
On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful
of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within
the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army
Doctrine, and in violation of international law. (Annex 53)
34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented
and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is no data from other
missions of similar size and duration to compare the number of escapes with,
the most significant factors derived from these reports are twofold. First,
investigations and SIRs lacked critical data needed to evaluate the details
of each incident. Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the
same types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct
the problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG Karpinski,
nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:
a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation covering
the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant
(320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or additional information
was provided as requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th
MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued
by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of
Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon
Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being
subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the
detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and
the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby
5 detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications,
no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the
QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated.
(ANNEX 5)
c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and shooting
of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee from
Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation
by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded that the detainees allegedly
escaped by crawling under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting.
One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion
search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and
killed by a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were
overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal detainees
at that location. It is of particular note that the command was informed
at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape attempt and started doing
amplified announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The investigation
pointed out that rules and guidelines were not posted in the camps in the
detainees’ native languages. (ANNEX 6)
d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the shooting
of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp Vigilant
Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP
Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly escaped by sliding
under the wire while the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This
detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same
day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks.
One guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters
injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the
Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped
through their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to
this investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th
MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of the
Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th
MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped
from the North end of the compound and was discovered missing during distribution
of the noon meal, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, # 151624,
# 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment,
Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3).
The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound,
but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 13)
h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216, #150894,
#153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146,
and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment.
This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees,
and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th
MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest
of their living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal
force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed
“Golden Spike,” the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly
force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive training
of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior
to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal
rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents,
ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized,
and poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)
i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction
team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of
recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade,
Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard
Site had gotten a pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working
in the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc
extraction team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called
a routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee.
Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention
ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of
authorization needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear
lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the MI and MP
assets. (ANNEX 8)
j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment,
Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section).
The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used
a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful.
No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has
been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)
k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment,
Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section).
The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used
two non-lethal shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information
on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided
to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)
l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got into
a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment,
Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion,
S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in the compound and
the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which
was successful. No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective
action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)
m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at
1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated
by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three
detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal shot
that calmed the situation. No information on findings, contributing factors,
or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
17)
n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca(310th MP
Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640
from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion
S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee
escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. Contributing factors
were inexperienced guards, lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of
leadership presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication
between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)
o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well as
the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention
Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around
0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh
Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three
of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell during conditions
of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot
with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding compound. That same
night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the camp
and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack
of a coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the
fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)
p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi guard from
Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped
at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by
SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an
Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out on a work detail
and disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing
person had been located. No information on findings, contributing factors,
or corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
99)
q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and 151933 from
Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped between
the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation
by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled
under a fence when visibility was only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing
factors were the limited visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack
of proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement
of detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs.
(ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined that
there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention
facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous reported
escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6
Investigations following these escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by
the Brigade Commander with no dissemination to other facilities. After-Action
Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities
and were not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade.
The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents. (AnnexES
5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:
(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced series
of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability practices throughout
the OIF area of operations. (U) Accountability practices throughout any
particular detention facility must be standardized and in accordance with
applicable regulations and international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting
systems must be expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real
time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location
to another. (U) “Change sheets,” or their doctrinal equivalent
must be immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate
accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the manifest
provided to the compound guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.
(U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing
the lessons learned from this investigation as well as any previous findings,
recommendations, and reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained
on, and understood at the lowest level.(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must
be held in separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U) All
of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP Soldiers
can account for their detainees in real time and without waiting for their
change sheets to be processed. This would also have the change sheet serve
as a way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest as updated by each compound.
The BATS and NDRS system can be utilized for this function.(U) Accountability
lapses, escapes, and disturbances within the detainment facilities must be
immediately reported through both the operational and administrative Chain
of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be tracked
and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved. (U) Detention
Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), and
the principles of the Geneva Conventions need to be briefed at every shift
change and guard mount. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents
at any given facility. The observations and corrective actions that develop
from the AARs must be analyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section,
developed into a plan of action, shared with the other facilities, and
implemented as a matter of policy. (U) There must be significant structural
improvements at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes include
significant enhancement of perimeter lighting, additional chain link fencing,
staking down of all concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion
of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules
must be prominently displayed in English and the language of the detainees
at each compound and encampment at every detention facility IAW AR 190-8.
(U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractors’ access throughout
the facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized and easily
identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the masses of detainees
in civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer period
of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll call and ISN counts
to ensure accurate accountability.(U) The method for doing head counts of
detainees within a given compound must be standardized. (U) Those military
units conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly reference
the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references provided
in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have enumerated. Although
they do not, and cannot, make up for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers,
at all levels, can use them to maintain standardized operating procedures
and efficient accountability practices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)
(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal
procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:
(Names deleted)
(ANNEXES 45-91)
REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP Brigade
on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since
that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the
Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th
MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion,
and 744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade
believed they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were released
from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation of
major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000
detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening
process, several thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed
they would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June
2003 the 800th MPBrigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal
system and several detention centers. This new mission meant Soldiers would
not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next
few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command to
mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses
that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their
basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these
deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than
ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple
Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a
mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib
Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of
the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during
their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments
prior to mobilization and during the post mobilization training, and thus
could not train for specific missions. The training that was accomplished
at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level
with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels,
and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However,
I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency,
ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military
Police School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the
Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary Barracks
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention
mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade
who had civilian corrections experience, including many who worked as prison
guards or corrections officials in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness
we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40.
It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater
missions was ever developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout
the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)
6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder’s Team, that the 800th MP Brigade
as a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked. Army
Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and
21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be able
to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation indicates
that BG Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout
the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees,
yet it was operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility
maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire battalion.
(ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)
7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement system
to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly
suffered from personnel shortages through release from active duty (REFRAD)
actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to being severely
undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities.
There were numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious
threat to Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was
also severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel
to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past associations
and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship
often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.
(ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of
the Investigation Team)
8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib (BCCF),
I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication
between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled
detainee operations inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of
responsibility between commands, little coordination at the command level,
and no integration of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest
possible levels with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and
46)
9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by
a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph
3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander’s Responsibilities for
the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:
3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.
3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED
THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205
MI BRIGADE FOR “SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION.”
Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units
at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively
made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units
conducting detainee operations at that facility. This is not doctrinally
sound due to the different missions and agendas assigned to each of these
respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July
2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and control
of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish
assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)
“TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or
commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited
to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the
operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON
is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders
at any echelon at or below the level of combatant commander.”
11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I
find that there was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the
800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence
if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the Commander, 800th
MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON relationship.
(ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and
personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued
to function as if they were responsible for the security, health and welfare,
and overall security of detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG
Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this were still the case.
(ANNEXES 45 and 46)
13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the Battalion
Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander
and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David
W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day basis. At one point,
BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately
two weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the pressure he was
experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan
immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7
Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski placed
LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th
MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also in
command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I
could find no orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from
command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the 320th. In addition,
there was no indication this removal and search for a replacement was
communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers
in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing
him with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without
notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my military
career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in accountability
that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was stigmatized
as a unit due to previous detainee abuse which occurred in May 2003 at the
Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC (P)
Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader,
BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in command of her most
troubled battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of detainees in the
800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties by LTG
Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)
14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview
with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in
the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much
of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was
her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the
problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor
leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic
standards and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal
Observations of the Interview Team)
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil Affairs
Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim
Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on
MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the MPs “ideas”
that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd Company Platoon
Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant,
MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were
the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of
FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEX 45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the criminal
abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been caused by the ultimate
disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp
Bucca in May 2003. She stated that “about the same time those incidents
were taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give
the guilty people at Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to
the soldiers, the worst that’s gonna happen is, you’re gonna go
home.” I think it important to point out that almost every witness testified
that the serious criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred
in late October and early November 2003. The photographs and statements clearly
support that the abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca cases
were set for trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of until
29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous
MP personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was
influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)
17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman
and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous
complaints, these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental effect
on the Brigade Staff’s effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade
Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to lack initiative
and was unwilling to accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary
Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by
failing to lay out staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed,
and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that
the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier
and Army standards. I specifically found these examples of unenforced standards:
a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned detention
duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and officers
were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear civilian clothes in the
FOB after duty hours while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and soft
caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been
reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those disciplined
include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)
1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
* Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, on 17 January
2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 2003,
for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective security measures
as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
* Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January 2004;
Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003,
for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had negligent discharge
of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction
of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by
a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which
he personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03,
for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade
Commander; filed locally.
5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation
of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
* Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to have taken
nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date
to be announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003,
for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge
of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
* GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for fraternizing with
junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was
removed from the CSM list.
9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003,
for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge
of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company
* GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August 2003,
for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge
of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,
* GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for violation
of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
* Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski, Commander
800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the guidance/directives given
to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert P.
Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical
Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by COL Pappas
for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse
the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as previously existed. (ANNEX
53)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade and the
320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little contact during
their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski
claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various
detention facilities where her Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed
calendar provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her
contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski
or LTC (P) Phillabaum. (Multiple Witness Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the difference
in culture, the Soldiers’ quality of life, the real presence of mortal
danger over an extended time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize
these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere that existed at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find that
there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade
Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in detainee operations
and proficiency or that serious accountability lapses that occurred over
a significant period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected.
AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon, followed
up with corrective action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or Soldiers.
Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at all,
were not read or understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission
of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp
Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed
corrective training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout
Iraq clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating
to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team )
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing by
LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez
found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the standards
set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six
months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency
and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited the recent detainee
abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor leadership
climate that “permeates the Brigade.” I totally concur with LTG
Sanchez’ opinion regarding the performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th
MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the Personal Observations of the Investigating
Officer)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved
from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
* Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities
throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that
Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
* Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood,
and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the
frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
* Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding
the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer misconduct.
* Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a
subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
* Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous
members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
* Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs
and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a
period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by,
subordinate commanders.
* Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command.
* Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
* Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers
throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
* Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention
facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15,
AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have
been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in and followed the IROE.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood,
and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion, be
Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand,
and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from
numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several months
were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
* Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6
Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood
the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task organize
to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
* Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team, including
his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly
trained in and followed the IROE.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, understood,
and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working
and “visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved
from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum
of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:
* Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General
Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to Soldier and
not filed.
* Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from various
15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander
800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
* Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse,
whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back
of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved
from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood
the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved
from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer Memorandum
of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood
the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved
from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
* Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that
he had “never” been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski,
when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG
Karpinski to “stay out of the towers” at the holding facility.
* Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that
he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP
Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment
of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and understood
the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment
and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved
from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and understood
the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment
and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand,
and receive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the
protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
* Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and “visiting”
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
* Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency,
and accountability.
* Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment
and Resettlement Operations.
* Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused detainees
by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator,
CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand
to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation
of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
* Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the locations
of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations, and his
knowledge of abuses.
* Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation
techniques, to facilitate interrogations by “setting conditions”
which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable
regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical
abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel,Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed
in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by competent
authority for the following acts or concerns which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:
* Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE,
which is contrary to several witness statements.
* Did not have a security clearance.
13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an
Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted
to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the 205th
MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve
L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly
or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly
recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs
as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full
extent of their culpability. (Annex 36)
OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS
1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I acquired the
assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the
investigation materials from a psychological perspective. He determined that
there was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers in an unsupervised
and dangerous setting. There was a complex interplay of many psychological
factors and command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is contained
in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.
2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy interview
with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in
the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during much
of her testimony. What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was
her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the
problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor
leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic
standards and principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual Soldiers
and some subordinate units under the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant
obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the Army Values.
We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative
in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.
a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis McGlone, efficiently
operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements
with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined,
proficient, and appeared to understand their basic tasks.
b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Stephen J. Novotny, effectively
maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were
proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well to this highly unique
and non-doctrinal operation.
c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing perimeter security and
force protection at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded
standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve discipline throughout
the FOB.
4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed and believe should
be favorably noted include:
a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro, US Navy Dog Handler,
knew his duties and refused to participate in improper interrogations despite
significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu Ghraib.
b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company discovered evidence of abuse
and turned it over to military law enforcement.
c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took immediate action and stopped
an abuse, then reported the incident to the chain of command.
CONCLUSION
1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave breaches
of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore,
key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade
failed to comply with established regulations, policies, and command directives
in preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during
the period August 2003 to February 2004.
2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations of this AR 15-6
Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments are essential
to establish the conditions with the resources and personnel required to
prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.
Annexes
1. Psychological Assessment
2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM
3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation
4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba
5. 15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003
6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003
7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003
8. 15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003
9. 15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004
10. 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004
11. SIR 5 November 2003
12. SIR 7 November 2003
13. SIR 8 November 2003
14. SIR 13 December 2003
15. SIR 13 December 2003
16. SIR 13 December 2003
17. SIR 17 December 2003
18. Commander’s Inquiry 26 January 2004
19. MG Ryder’s Report, 6 November 2003
20. MG Miller’s Report, 9 September 2003
21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees,
and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August
2001
23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949
25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004
26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004
27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004
28. 205th MI Brigade’s IROE, Undated
29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding witnesses
30. Investigation Team’s witness list
31. FRAGO #1108
32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP Brigade and Rating
Chain with suspensions annotated
33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June 2003
35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003
36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984
37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion
38. 310th MP Battalion’s Inprocessing SOP
39. 320th MP Battalion’s “Change Sheet”
40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center’s (JIDC) Slides, Undated
41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004
42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10 July 2001
43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand
44. 800th MP Battalion’s TACSOP
45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry of Justice
48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th MP Brigade
49. LTC James O’Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade
50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI Battalion (Tactical
exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and OIC Arifjan
Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, 800th MP Brigade
73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP Battalion
74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP Battalion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th MP Battalion
79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP Battalion
83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACI, 205th
MI Brigade
91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter, Titan Corporation,
205th MI Brigade
92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military Justice, CFLCC,
9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG Karpinski, 17 January
2004
103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company